Reflection algebras and conservation results for theories of iterated
  truth by Beklemishev, Lev D. & Pakhomov, Fedor N.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
8.
10
30
2v
2 
 [m
ath
.L
O]
  3
0 O
ct 
20
19
Reflection algebras and conservation results for
theories of iterated truth∗
Lev D. Beklemishev† and Fedor N. Pakhomov
Steklov Mathematical Institute of Russian Academy of Sciences
Gubkina str. 8, 119991 Moscow, Russia
October 31, 2019
Abstract
We consider extensions of the language of Peano arithmetic by
transfinitely iterated truth definitions satisfying uniform Tarskian bi-
conditionals. Without further axioms, such theories are known to be
conservative extensions of the original system of arithmetic. Much
stronger systems, however, are obtained by adding either induction
axioms or reflection axioms on top of them. Theories of this kind can
interpret some well-known predicatively reducible fragments of second-
order arithmetic such as iterated arithmetical comprehension.
We obtain sharp results on the proof-theoretic strength of these
systems using methods of provability logic. Reflection principles natu-
rally define unary operators acting on the semilattice of axiomatizable
extensions of our basic theory of iterated truth. The substructure gen-
erated by the top element of this algebra provides a canonical ordinal
notation system for the class of theories under investigation.
Using these notations we obtain conservativity relationships for it-
erated reflection principles of different logical complexity levels cor-
responding to the levels of the hyperarithmetical hierarchy, i.e., the
analogs of Schmerl’s formulas. These relationships, in turn, provide
proof-theoretic analysis of our systems and of some related predica-
tively reducible theories. In particular, we uniformly calculate the
ordinals characterizing the standard measures of their proof-theoretic
strength, such as provable well-orderings, classes of provably recursive
functions, and Π0
1
-ordinals.
1 Introduction
This paper continues the line of research that started with [3]. The main
idea of this approach is to study questions of proof-theoretic analysis of
∗Research financed by a grant of the Russian Science Foundation (project No. 16–11–
10252).
†The corresponding author, e-mail: bekl@mi-ras.ru.
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theories from the point of view of provability logic methods. Using such
methods leads one to consider algebraic structures that occupy, in a sense,
an intermediate position between the highly complex world of formal theories
(such as systems of first- or second-order arithmetic and set theory) and the
simpler and constructive world of natural ordinal notation systems.
This approach has previously been applied to Peano arithmetic, its frag-
ments and modest extensions. In this paper we make the next necessary step
and consider from this point of view theories of predicative strength. Theo-
ries of this kind emerged in the works of Solomon Feferman and Kurt Schu¨tte
in the 1960s who explicated the informal notion of predicative proof in terms
of certain systems of ramified analysis and isolated the proof-theoretic ordi-
nal Γ0 as a bound to transfinite induction provable in such systems [18, 43].
Since that time, systems reducible to predicative ones in the sense of Fefer-
man and Schu¨tte have been studied quite extensively.
Even though the emphasis in the work in proof theory later shifted to
much stronger impredicative theories, theories of predicative strength and
bounds thereof remain an important landmark. Thus, a system ATR0 of
proof-theoretic strength exactly Γ0 was isolated by Harvey Friedman in pur-
suing the reverse mathematics program. Modulo a weak second order the-
ory, that system turned out to be equivalent to some well-known theorems
of ordinary mathematics.
Feferman with his collaborators returned to the analysis of predicativ-
ity several times during his long career, formulating ever more convincing
and simpler to state predicative systems (see e.g. [19, 20]). More recently,
Nick Weaver [47] disputed the fact that systems presented by Feferman and
Schu¨tte adequately represent the informal notion of predicativity. We are
sympathetic with the doubts of this kind. However, we also believe that the
class of systems isolated by Feferman and Schu¨tte is important in its own
right irrespectively of the association of one or another informal notion of
predicative proof with it. Henceforth, we will be using the term predicative
in the sense of Feferman–Schu¨tte.
The goal of this paper is to provide an alternative approach to proof-
theoretic analysis of the class of theories of proof-theoretic strength below
Γ0. The main feature of this analysis is the use of hierarchies of reflection
principles and conservation results between them instead of the use of in-
finitary calculi. Under this approach, the ordinal notation systems emerge
in the guise of weak propositional (strictly positive) logics, i.e., fragments
of provability logic representing the algebras of reflection principles. The
close relation between the objects representing the ordinals and the objects
representing the theories makes for us the reductions from one to the other
rather simple.
Provalibility logics with transfinitely many modalities, such as GLPΛ
and their strictly positive counterparts RCΛ, have been studied already for
some time, most notably in the series of works by Joost Joosten and David
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Ferna´ndez-Duque, see [5, 14, 13, 22, 1, 29, 26, 21]. However, our study
seems to be the first one where this machinery is developed enough to yield
proof-theoretic analysis results for theories significantly stronger than Peano
arithmetic. The main novelty of this paper from a technical point of view
are basic conservation theorems (Theorems 1 and 2) generalizing the so-
called reduction property in arithmetic. The machinery of reflection algebras
is then used to generalize these results to transfinitely iterated reflection
principles and higher levels of logical complexity.
Another advantage of our approach is that it allows one to obtain the
main results associated with proof-theoretic analysis of theories — such as
consistency proofs, determination of the classes of provably total computable
functions, characterization of provable well-orderings — all at once. This
is based on a general formula relating hierarchies of reflection principles
of different strength. Formulas of this kind appeared in the work of Ulf
Schmerl, first for arithmetic [41] and then for the ramified analysis [42]. In
this paper we are, in a sense, redoing the work of Schmerl, but in a different
way and, to simplify matters, for a different class of systems (which are first
order rather than ramified second order).
The reflection principles for theories of truth already have been inves-
tigated (see [12, Chapter XII]). Graham Leigh [34] have studied reflection
principles over theories of iterated truth predicates. He characterizes arith-
metical consequences of such theories in terms of transfinite induction using
the tools of infinitary proof theory. Our basic theory of uniform Tarski bi-
conditionals is rather similar to the one of [34], however we consider finer
hierarchies of reflection principles and use different methods.
Our treatment is essentially self-contained and includes sometimes care-
ful proofs of results that are more or less well-known. The only proof-
theoretic tool that we are using is the standard cut-elimination for pred-
icate logic in the form of Tait calculus. We also rely on the method of
arithmetization along with the construction of truth definitions.
The basic systems for which we state our results are formulated in the
first-order language of Peano arithmetic expanded by a series of new unary
predicate letters representing iterated truth definitions. These predicates are
postulated to satisfy rather weak axioms for truth — the so-called uniform
Tarski biconditionals.1 The use of weak axioms for truth and delegating
the main power of the system to reflection principles added on top of them
is one of the key technical ideas of this paper. It is interesting to remark
that in this way we can recover some of the results about the compositional
1From the point of view of the theory of truth it is more interesting and common to
consider stronger axioms for truth predicates, e.g., the compositional axioms CT. Theories
based on compositional axioms for truth can also be considered in our context, and in fact
they were considered by Lev Beklemishev and Evgeny Dashkov at an earlier stage of this
project. However, this choice leads to undesirable complications, both on the level of proof
theory and on the level of modal logic, which we prefer to avoid.
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truth axioms, e.g., a theorem due to Henryk Kotlarski on the strength of
∆0(T)-induction schema over CT [31]. The plan of this paper is as follows.
In Sections 3 and 4 we prove two key conservation results for the theory
of uniform Tarski biconditionals extended by restricted uniform reflection
principles. The first of these results gives a conservation of Π1(T)-reflection
principle over the arithmetical uniform reflection principle, for all arith-
metical sentences. The second result, for each n > 0, is a conservation of
Πn+1(T)-reflection principle over ω-times iterated Πn(T)-reflection principle
for Πn(T)-sentences. In Section 5 we introduce theories of iterated truth
predicates and the corresponding reflection principles. We reinterpret the
results of Sections 3 and 4 for these theories as two different reduction for-
mulas. Section 6 considers a strictly positive logic with transfinitely many
modalities, RCΛ, which is a straightforward generalization of the reflection
calculus RC. We recapitulate the results of [5] calculating the order types
of the ordering of RCΛ formulas. In Section 7 we capitalize on the previous
work and obtain Schmerl-type conservation results for iterated truth the-
ories by using RCΛ. In Section 8 we outline the ideas of ordinal analysis
of iterated reflection and the use of reflection algebras for this purpose. In
Section 9 we apply these results to obtain conservation theorems and ordinal
analysis of some standard systems of second-order arithmetic of predicative
strength.
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by the first author as a second part of [3] and a continuation of [5], how-
ever the work turned out to be more complicated than expected and ex-
perienced various delays. Later other people, most notably Joost Joosten
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to stronger reflection principles. The first author and Dashkov subsequently
worked on theories of iterated truth predicates based on Tarski composi-
tional axioms, but the paper was never completed. The present paper also
owes a lot to Evgeny Kolmakov whose active interest revitalized this work
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2 Preliminaries: languages and truth theories
As our basic system of arithmetic we take Elementary Arithmetic EA, also
known as EFA or I∆0(exp), in any of its standard formulations (see [24, 4]).
The language of EA has symbols for successor, addition, multiplication,
exponentiation functions and the order relation. The axioms of EA comprise
basic defining equations for all these symbols, as well as the induction axioms
for bounded (∆0) formulas. We allow exp in quatifier bounding terms in
the definition of the class ∆0. EA
+ denotes the extension of EA by an
axiom asserting the totality of superexponentiation function, also known as
I∆0 + Supexp (see [24]).
Let L be a first order language extending that of EA with at most count-
ably many fresh predicate symbols. We assume fixed an elementary Go¨del
numbering of L.
Let ∆L0 denote the class of formulas obtained from atomic L-formulas
and formulas of the form T(t), where t is a term, by Boolean connectives
and bounded quantifiers. The classes ΠLn and Σ
L
n are defined from ∆
L
0 in
the usual way: ΠL0 = Σ
L
0 = ∆
L
0 , Π
L
n+1 = {∀~x ϕ(~x) : ϕ ∈ Σ
L
n}, and Σ
L
n+1 =
{∃~x ϕ(~x) : ϕ ∈ ΠLn}. IΓ denotes the induction schema restricted to Γ-
formulas. EAL denotes the extension of EA by ∆L0 -induction schema.
The extension of L by a unary predicate symbol T is denoted L(T). For
typographical reasons the classes ∆
L(T)
0 , Π
L(T)
n , Σ
L(T)
n will also be denoted
∆L0 (T), Π
L
n(T), Σ
L
n(T), respectively.
We consider an L(T)-theory UTBL axiomatized by the following schemata:
U1: ∀~x (ϕ(~x)↔ T(pϕ(~x)q)) , for all L-formulas ϕ(~x);
U2: ¬T(n), for all n such that n is not a Go¨del number of an L-sentence.
Here, pϕ(~x)q is an elementarily definable term representing the function
mapping n1, . . . , nk to the Go¨del number of ϕ(n1, . . . , nk), provided ~x =
x1, . . . , xk.
The theory UTBL plays a central role in this paper. We remark that it
can be given a natural ΠL2 -axiomatization by taking U2 together with the
following schemata, for all L-formulas ϕ, ψ:
C1: ∀~x (ϕ(~x)↔ T(pϕ(~x)q)) , if ϕ(~x) is atomic;
C2: ∀~x (T(pϕ(~x) ∧ ψ(~x)q)↔ T(pϕ(~x)q) ∧ T(pψ(~x)q));
C3: ∀~x (T(p¬ϕ(~x)q)↔ ¬T(pϕ(~x)q));
C4: ∀~x (T(p∀y ϕ(y,~x)q)↔ ∀y T(pϕ(~x)q)).
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If Axioms C2–C4 are stated as ‘global’ axioms with a universal quantifier
over Go¨del numbers of L-formulas ϕ,ψ, the corresponding theory is known
as Tarski compositional axioms for truth and is denoted CTL in this paper.
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The following lemma is well-known and straightforward, it is verifiable
in EA by building a local interpretation. Let S be any L-theory containing
EA.
Lemma 2.1 S + UTBL is conservative over S for L-formulas.
By a Go¨delian theory we mean a theory, in a language as above, whose
set of axioms comes equipped with an elementary (∆0(exp)) formula defining
its set of Go¨del numbers in the standard model of arithmetic. With every
such theory S we associate its Σ1 provability predicate ✷S(x) in a standard
way [17]. We say that S1 U -provably contains S2 if
U ⊢ ∀x (✷S2(x)→ ✷S1(x)).
Suppose S is Go¨delian and Γ is a set of formulas in the language of S. By
Γ-RFN(S) we denote the uniform reflection principle for Γ-formulas, that
is, the schema
∀x (✷Sϕ(x)→ ϕ(x)), ϕ ∈ Γ.
In particular, L-RFN(S) is the uniform reflection principle for all L-formulas.
T-RFN(S) is the following T-reflection principle:
∀ϕ ∈ L (✷Sϕ→ T(ϕ)) .
We note two obvious lemmas.
Lemma 2.2 Suppose S EA-provably contains UTBL.
(i) EA ⊢ ∀ψ ∈ L✷UTBL (ψ ↔ T(ψ));
(ii) T-RFN(S) is equivalent to ∀ϕ ∈ L (✷ST(ϕ)→ T(ϕ)) over EA;
(iii) EA + UTBL + T-RFN(S) contains L-RFN(S);
(iv) EA +∆L0 (T)-RFN(S) contains T-RFN(S);
(v) EA + ΠL2 (T)-RFN(S) proves the compositional axioms CTL.
Proof. Concerning the proof of (v), we remark that provably in EA, for
all L-formulas ϕ,ψ, conditions C2–C4 are provable in S (since S contains
UTB). Since C2–C4 are at most ΠL2 , we infer CTL by applying reflection for
S. ✷
Let L be a language with or without T.
2It is denoted CT−L in some treatments to stress the absence of induction axioms. We
do not presuppose any induction axioms in CTL.
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Lemma 2.3 (i) ΠL1 -RFN(S) is equivalent to ∆
L
0 -RFN(S) over EA;
(ii) ΠLn+1-RFN(S) is equivalent to Σ
L
n-RFN(S) over EA.
Next we recall that reflection implies induction, as noted by Kreisel and
Le´vy [33].
Lemma 2.4 If S is an L-theory provably containing EA, then
(i) EA +∆L0 -RFN(S) ⊢ I∆
L
0 ;
(ii) EA + ΠLn+2-RFN(S) ⊢ IΠ
L
n , for each n > 1;
(iii) EA + L-RFN(S) ⊢ IL.
Proof. (i) The usual argument goes, for any ∆L0 -formula ϕ, as follows. First,
show that
EA ⊢ ∀n ✷S(ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x 6 n (ϕ(x)→ ϕ(x+ 1))→ ϕ(n)).
Then, using ∆L0 -RFN(S) we infer
∀n (ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x 6 n (ϕ(x)→ ϕ(x+ 1))→ ϕ(n)),
which implies the standard instance of the induction axiom for ϕ.
The proof of Claims (ii) and (iii) is similar. ✷
Remark 2.5 For the language of arithmetic, by a well-known result of
D. Leivant [35], the theory IΠn is equivalent to EA + Πn+2-RFN(EA) for
each n > 1. This implies the earlier result by Kreisel and Le´vy that
EA + RFN(EA) ≡ PA.
However, for the language with a truth predicate, full reflection over
EA+UTBL is stronger than full induction. One can prove by a simple model-
theoretic argument that the theory EA+UTBL+IL(T) is a conservative ex-
tension of PA. On the other hand, the theory EA+L(T)-RFN(EA + UTBL)
is not: By Lemma 2.2 (v) it proves the compositional axioms CTL, which
already with the weaker T-reflection imply arithmetical reflection over PA
(see Kotlarski [31]).
3 Conservativity of Π1(T)-reflection
Theorem 1 Suppose S is a theory in a language extending L(T) and prov-
ably containing EA + UTBL. Then EA + UTBL + Π
L
1 (T)-RFN(S) is a con-
servative extension of EA+ L-RFN(S) for L-formulas.
Remark 3.1 EA+L-RFN(S) contains the L-fragment of S, because if ϕ ∈
L and S ⊢ ϕ then EA ⊢ ✷Sϕ and hence EA + L-RFN(S) ⊢ ϕ.
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Proof. For each finite fragment F of the signature of L and a finite set Γ ⊆
UTBF we will construct a non-relativizing and F-preserving interpretation
of the theory EA+Γ+∆F0 (T)-RFN(S) in EA+F-RFN(S). By Lemma 2.3(i)
this yields a suitable local interpretation of EA + UTBL + Π
L
1 (T)-RFN(S)
which implies L-conservativity by compactness.
Axioms of Γ are either of the form ¬T(n) or of the form
∀x1 . . . ∀xn (ψ(x1, . . . , xn)↔ T(pψ(x1, . . . , xn)q)),
for some ψ ∈ F . Fix an m < ω such that, for each axiom of Γ and the
corresponding formula ψ, both ψ and ¬ψ are in ΠFm. It is well-known that
there is a truth definition TrΠFm in EA
F for ΠFm-formulas (see Theorem 13 in
the Appendix, where a somewhat sharper result needed later is spelled out).
In the following proof we read Rm(S) as Π
F
m+1-RFN(S). By Lemma 2.4,
EA + R0(S) contains EA
F .
In Lemma 3.2 we construct an F-formula θ(x) that will serve as the
interpretation of T(x). Here and below ∧˙, ¬˙,
∧˙
stand for elementary terms
defining syntactical operations on the Go¨del numbers of formulas, as in
Feferman [17].
Lemma 3.2 There is a ΠFm+2-formula θ(x) such that the following proper-
ties hold provably in EA+ F-RFN(S):
T0. ∀ϕ (θ(ϕ)→ ϕ ∈ F) (θ defines a set of F-sentences);
T1. ∀ϕ ∈ F (✷S(ϕ)→ θ(ϕ)) (θ contains the F-fragment of S);
T2. ∀ϕ ∈ F (θ(¬˙ϕ)↔ ¬θ(ϕ)) and ∀ϕ,ψ ∈ F (θ(ϕ ∧˙ψ)↔ θ(ϕ) ∧ θ(ψ))
(θ commutes with propositional connectives);
T3. ∀ϕ
(
TrΠFm(ϕ)→ θ(ϕ)
)
(θ contains all true ΠFm-sentences).
Before proving this lemma, let us show that these properties are sufficient
to prove the translations of all the axioms of Γ + ∆F0 (T)-RFN(S) in EA +
F-RFN(S).3
If an axiom of Γ has the form ¬T(n), where n is not the G.n. of an
L-sentence, then ¬θ(n) is provable by T0. The other axioms of Γ translate
into ψ(~x) ↔ θ(pψ(~x)q). Note that the implication ψ(~x) → θ(pψ(~x)q) fol-
lows from T3. Applying T3 to ¬ψ(~x) we obtain θ(p¬ψ(~x)q) which yields
¬θ(pψ(~x)q) by T2.
To deal with bounded quantifiers we need a definition and two lemmas.
For each ∆F0 (T)-formula ϕ(~x) we specify an elementarily definable term
ϕ∗(~x) as follows:
1. ϕ(~x)∗ = pϕ(~x)q, if ϕ(~x) is an atomic F-formula;
3With some care, one can check that T0–T3 can, in fact, be verified in EA+Rm+3(S).
8
2. T(t(~x))∗ = t′(~x), where t′(~x) provably in EA satisfies
t′(~x) :=
{
t(~x), if t(~x) is a G.n. of an F-sentence,
p0 = 1q, otherwise;
3. (ϕ ∧ ψ)∗ = (ϕ∗∧˙ψ∗); (¬ϕ)∗ = ¬˙ϕ∗;
4. (∀u 6 t ϕ(u, ~x))∗ =
∧˙
i6tϕ
∗(i, ~x).
For each ~n, ϕ∗(~n) denotes the Go¨del number of a sentence which is
equivalent to ϕ(~n) in UTBF . Formalizing this fact in EA yields
Lemma 3.3 For each ∆F0 (T)-formula ϕ(~x),
EA ⊢ ∀~x✷S(pϕ(~x)q ↔˙ϕ
∗(~x)).
Proof. Induction on the build-up of ϕ. If ϕ ∈ F and atomic, the claim
is trivial. If ϕ has the form T(t(~x)) for some term t, we reason in EA as
follows. Given ~x, if t(~x) is the G.n. of an F-sentence ψ, then ✷S(T(ψ)↔ ψ)
by Lemma 2.2, and the claim follows. If t(~x) = n is not a G.n. of an F-
sentence, then ϕ∗(~x) = t′(~x) = p0 = 1q. By the axioms U2 and the equality
axioms, the sentence T(t(~x)) is equivalent to T(n) and refutable in S. Hence,
it is equivalent to 0 = 1 and to ϕ∗(~x).
Boolean connectives preserve the equivalence. For the bounded quanti-
fier, we use the fact that
EA ⊢ ∀ϕ∀n ✷S(p∀x 6 n ϕ(x)q ↔˙
∧˙
x6n pϕ(x)q).
✷
Let ϕθ denote the translation of a formula ϕ ∈ F(T) under the substi-
tution T(t)/θ(t).
Lemma 3.4 For each ∆F0 (T)-formula ϕ there holds
EA+ F-RFN(S) ⊢ ϕθ ↔ θ(ϕ∗).
Proof. We argue by induction on the build-up of ϕ. All cases except for
the case of a bounded quantifier are easy. Let ϕ = ∀x 6 t ψ(x). Then ϕθ is
equivalent to ∀x 6 t θ(ψ∗(x)) by the induction hypothesis. We claim that
EA + F-RFN(S) ⊢ ∀y (∀x 6 y θ(ψ∗)↔ θ(
∧˙
i6yψ
∗(i)).
The implication from left to right is proved by induction on y using T2. By
Lemma 2.4 the induction is available in EA+ F-RFN(S). The implication
from right to left is easier and can be inferred from T1 and T2 without the
use of induction.
From this claim we conclude that ∀x 6 t θ(ψ∗(x)) is equivalent to
θ(
∧˙
i6tψ
∗(i)) which is the same as θ(ϕ∗). This concludes the proof of lemma.
✷
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Lemma 3.5 EA+ F-RFN(S) proves the translation of ∆F0 (T)-RFN(S).
Proof. Let ϕ(x) be a ∆F0 (T)-formula. Reasoning in EA+F-RFN(S) assume
✷Sϕ(x). Then ✷Sϕ
∗(x), by Lemma 3.3. By T1, we infer θ(ϕ∗(x)), which
implies ϕ(x)θ by Lemma 3.4. ✷
Now we prove Lemma 3.2. The formula θ(x) is constructed via the
standard (arithmetized) process of completion of S, but with m-consistency
instead of the usual consistency (cf. [17, Theorem 4.11]). We note that this
construction is simpler than (and, in fact, a part of) the equally well-known
construction of a Henkin-completion of S. Namely, let ϕ0, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, . . . be
an enumeration of all F-sentences, set T0 = ∅ and define
Tn+1 :=
{
Tn + ϕn, if S + all true Π
F
m-sentences + Tn + ϕn is consistent,
Tn, otherwise.
Next we will give the formula θ(x) such that θ(ϕx) expresses the fact that
ϕx ∈ Tω =
⋃
n∈ω
Tn.
Let x ∈A z express in EA that the x-th bit in the binary expansion of z
is 1. Formally we put θ(x) to be ∃y (x = ϕy ∧ θ
′(y)), where θ′(x) is
∃s, l(x ≤ l∧ x ∈A s∧ (∀i ≤ l)(i ∈A s↔ Rm(S + {ϕj | j < i, j ∈A s}+ϕi))).
Now let us check that the theory EA+F-RFN(S) proves the conditions
T0–T3 for θ(x). The condition T0 trivially follows from the definition of
θ(x). Recall that by Lemma 2.4 the theory F-RFN(S) contains full scheme
of F-induction. Reasoning in EA + F-RFN(S) we prove by induction on n
that Rm(S + Tn) (which is just a formalized version of the assertion S +
all true ΠFm-sentences+Tn is consistent). Using this it is easy to derive that
S ⊆ Tω, which yields T1. Similarly, Tω contains all true Π
F
m sentences, which
gives us T3. Further, for each ϕ exactly one of the following two possibilities
holds 1. ϕ ∈ Tω or 2. ¬ϕ ∈ Tω; this gives us the part of T2 about negation.
Finally, we prove that Tω is closed under first-order deduction, which in
particular implies the part of T2 about conjunction.
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.2 and of Theorem 1. ✷
Corollary 3.6 If S is an L(T)-theory, then
EA+ UTBL +Π
L
1 (T)-RFN(S + UTBL)
is a conservative extension of EA+ L-RFN(S) for L-formulas.
Proof. Since S+UTBL is conservative over S, we have L-RFN(S + UTBL) ≡
L-RFN(S). The result now follows by applying the previous theorem to the
theory S + UTBL. ✷
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4 Conservativity of Πn+1(T)-reflection
The main result of this section is a relativization of the reduction property
for arithmetical reflection principles, that is, of Theorem 2 in [2]. In the
present setup the usual argument in arithmetic goes through without any
substantial changes. However, we need to take care of some extra details.
The most important detail is the need for the reflection schemata to be
finitely axiomatizable, for the easy (inclusion) part of the theorem. This
part is based on the existence of partial truth definitions and the finiteness
of the language and requires ∆L0 (T)-induction, whereas the conservation part
does not.
In this section L can be a language with or without T. Let S be a
Go¨delian theory in a language extending L and provably containing EA.
We abbreviate by RS,n(ϕ) the schema Π
L
n+1-RFN(S + ϕ). We also write
RS,n for RS,n(⊤). If L is finite, RS,n will be finitely axiomatizable. However,
in general, RS,n(ϕ) is an elementarily axiomatized (possibly infinite) schema.
We read R1 ⊢ R2 as: each instance ϕ2 ∈ R2 is provable in EA+R1; R1∧R2
denotes R1 ∪R2, and R1 ∨R2 is the set {ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 : ϕ1 ∈ R1, ϕ2 ∈ R2}.
Lemma 4.1 For all n > 0, the following properties hold provably in EA:
For all sentences ϕ,ψ ∈ L,
(i) If S ⊢ ϕ→ ψ then RS,n(ϕ) ⊢ RS,n(ψ);
(ii) RS,n(ϕ ∨ ψ) ⊢ RS,n(ϕ) ∨ RS,n(ψ);
(iii) RS,n(ϕ) ⊢ ϕ if ϕ ∈ Π
L
n+1;
(iv) RS,n(ϕ) ⊢ ✸Sϕ.
Proof. For each item we give an informal argument that can be readily
formalized in EA.
(i) To derive RS,n(ψ) assume ✷S+ψθ(m) with θ ∈ Π
L
n+1. Since S ⊢ ϕ→ ψ
we have ✷S+ϕθ(m). Hence, using RS,n(ϕ) we obtain θ(m) by reflection.
(ii) Assume θ ∈ RS,n(ϕ) ∨ RS,n(ψ), then θ ⊜ θ1 ∨ θ2 with θ1 ∈ RS,n(ϕ)
and θ2 ∈ Rn(ψ). For some formulas ϕ1, ψ1 ∈ Π
L
n we have
θ1 ⊜ ∀x (✷S+ϕϕ1(x)→ ϕ1(x)) and θ2 ⊜ ∀x (✷S+ψψ1(x)→ ψ1(x)).
We observe that θ1 ∨ θ2 is logically equivalent to
∀x ∀y (✷S+ϕϕ1(x) ∧ ✷S+ψψ1(y)→ (ϕ1(x) ∨ ψ1(y))). (1)
Reasoning in EA + RS,n(ϕ ∨ ψ) we now prove formula (1). Consider any
x, y and assume ✷S+ϕϕ1(x)∧✷S+ψψ1(y). Then obviously ✷S+ϕ∨ψ(ϕ1(x)∨
ψ1(y)). Hence, ϕ1(x) ∨ ψ1(y) by reflection, which proves (1).
(iii) If ϕ ∈ ΠLn+1, then the schema RS,n(ϕ) contains ✷S+ϕϕ → ϕ. Since
EA ⊢ ✷S+ϕϕ, ϕ follows.
(iv) The instance of RS,n(ϕ) for ⊥ implies ✸Sϕ. ✷
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Theorem 2 Let a theory U be axiomatized over EA by a set of ΠLn+2-
sentences. Then, U+RS,n+1 is a Π
L
n+1-conservative extension of the closure
of U under the rule ϕ/RS,n(ϕ) for ϕ ∈ Π
L
n+1.
Remark 4.2 Notice that UTBL is axiomatized over EA by Π
L
2 (T)-sentences,
hence the result applies to L(T)-theories U containing UTBL. Also notice
that the conclusion RS,n(ϕ) of the rule is, generally, a schema rather than a
sentence, which means that one is allowed to infer from ϕ any instance of
that schema.
Proof. As in the arithmetical case the proof goes by considering a cut-free
derivation in Tait calculus of the sequent
¬U, Σ, Π, (2)
where Π is a set of ΠLn+1-formulas, ¬U is a finite set of the negations of
the axioms of U , and Σ is a finite set of the negations of the ΣLn+1-RFN(S)
schema instances. Every such instance has the form
∃y∃x [PrfS(y, p¬ϕ(x)q) ∧ ϕ(x)],
for some ϕ(x) ∈ ΠLn+1. Let Pϕ(x, y) denote the formula in square brackets.
We can also assume the axioms of U to have the form ∀x1 . . . ∀xm¬A(x1, . . . , xm),
for some ΠLn+1-formulas A(~x).
By the subformula property, any formula occurring in a derivation of a
sequent Γ of the form (2) either (a) is a ΠLn+1-formula, or (b) has the form
Σ, ∃xPϕ(t, x) or Pϕ(t, s), for some terms s, t, or (c) has the form
∃xi+1 . . . ∃xmA(t1, . . . , ti, xi+1, . . . , xm),
for some i < m and terms t1, . . . , ti. Let Γ
− denote the result of deleting all
formulas of types (b) and (c) from Γ. Let U ′ denote the closure of U under
the rule ϕ/RS,n(ϕ) with ϕ ∈ Π
L
n+1.
Lemma 4.3 If a sequent Γ of the form (2) is cut-free provable, then
∨
Γ−
is provable in U ′.
Proof. Induction on the height d of a derivation of Γ. It is sufficient to
consider the case that a formula of type (b) or (c) is introduced by the last
application of a rule in d; besides, it is sufficient to only consider the formu-
las Pϕ(t, s) and ∃xmA(t1, . . . , tm−1, xm), because in all the other cases the
premise and the conclusion of the rule coincide, after applying the operation
(·)−. The second case is easy (see [2]).
Thus, let us assume that a derivation d has the form
PrfS(t, p¬ϕ(s)q),∆ ϕ(s),∆
Pϕ(t, s),∆
(∧)
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where ϕ ∈ ΠLn+1 and p¬ϕ(s)q denotes the result of substituting the term s
into the term p¬ϕ(x)q. Then, by the induction hypothesis, we obtain some
derivations in U ′ of the formulas
PrfS(t, p¬ϕ(s)q) ∨
∨
∆− (3)
and
ϕ(s) ∨
∨
∆−. (4)
Since ∆− consists of ΠLn+1-formulas, the reflection rule is applicable to (4)
and we obtain a U ′-proof of
RS,n(ϕ(s(~x)) ∨
∨
∆−(~x)).
Using Lemma 4.1 we derive:
1. RS,n(
∨
∆−(~x)) ∨ RS,n(ϕ(s(~x))
2.
∨
∆−(~x) ∨ RS,n(ϕ(s(~x)))
3.
∨
∆−(~x) ∨ RS,n(ϕ(s)) (by Lemma 4.1 of [2])
4.
∨
∆−(~x) ∨✸Sϕ(s).
On the other hand, replacing t by an existential quantifier from (3) we obtain∨
∆−(~x) ∨ ✷S¬ϕ(s).
Together with 4. by the rule of cut this yields a U ′-proof of
∨
∆−. This
concludes the proof of Lemma 4.3 and thereby of Theorem 2. ✷
Now we show that under certain conditions one can characterize the
closure of U under the rule ϕ/RS,n(ϕ) for ϕ ∈ Π
L
n+1 by ω-iterated reflection
principles.
Let a signature L now be finite. We begin by stating the well-known fact
that the schema I∆L0 is finitely axiomatizable over EA. This is a corollary
of the following proposition (see Lemma 4.2 in [16] for a short proof) that
we state for a single unary predicate P . Recall that x ∈A z means that the
x-th bit in the binary expansion of z is 1.
Proposition 4.4 The following are equivalent over EA:
(i) I∆0(P );
(ii) ∀n ∃z ∀x < n (P (x)↔ x ∈A z).
Corollary 4.5 If L is finite, I∆L0 is finitely axiomatizable over EA.
The following theorem is crucial for several results in this paper.
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Theorem 3 Let L be finite. Then the schema ΠLn+1-RFN(S) is finitely ax-
iomatizable over EA.
Proof. Let π ∈ ΠL1 denote the formula axiomatizing I∆
L
0 over EA. We
know that the schema RS,n implies π. We claim that RS,n is equivalent over
EA to a conjunction of π and the formula
∀ϕ ∈ ΠLn+1 (✷Sϕ→ Trn+1(ϕ)), (5)
where Trm is the truth definition for Π
L
m-formulas constructed in Appendix A.
Clearly, (5) implies RS,n in EA + π: For each ϕ ∈ Π
L
n+1 we can infer from
✷Sϕ(x) the formula Trn+1(ϕ(x)) by (5) and then ϕ(x) using π.
For the opposite implication we first remark that I∆L0 and π are provable
from ΠLn+1-RFN(S) by Lemma 2.4. In order to prove (5) we consider two
cases: n = 0 and n > 0. For n = 0 we use Theorem 13 (ii) saying that, for
all ϕ ∈ ΠL1 ,
EA ⊢ ϕ→ Tr1(ϕ).
This fact is formalizable in EA. Then, since S provably contains EA, ✷Sϕ
implies ✷STr1(ϕ) and hence Tr1(ϕ) by reflection.
If n > 0 then we reason in EA as follows. If ϕ ∈ ΠLn+1 and ✷Sϕ then
✷S(π → ϕ). Since π provably entails I∆
L
0 over S, and by Theorem 13 (i)
EAL ⊢ ϕ↔ Trn+1(ϕ),
we obtain ✷S(π → Trn+1(ϕ)). The formula π → Trn+1(ϕ) is logically
equivalent to a ΠLn+1-formula. Hence, by Π
L
n+1-reflection, we can infer π →
Trn+1(ϕ). By an application of Π
L
1 -reflection we prove π and thus we can
infer Trn+1(ϕ). ✷
Let R0S,n := ⊤, R
k+1
S,n := RS,n(R
k
S,n). We can then define R
ω
S,n as the
(infinite) schema {RkS,n : k < ω}.
Lemma 4.6 Suppose S provably contains U and n > 1. The following
theories are equivalent:
(i) U + ϕ/RS,n(ϕ) for ϕ ∈ Π
L
n ;
(ii) U + {RkS,n : k < ω}.
Proof. Since the schemata RS,n(ψ) are finitely axiomatizable, by external
induction on k we can derive RkS,n using k applications of the rule. Hence,
theory (i) contains (ii).
The theory U + {RkS,n : k < ω} is closed under the rule: if U +R
k
S,n ⊢ ϕ,
then S + RkS,n contains S + ϕ, therefore U + RS,n(R
k
S,n) ⊢ RS,n(ϕ).✷
We now combine Theorem 2 and Lemma 4.6 into the following theorem
that will be used below.
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Theorem 4 Suppose L is finite. If U is a ΠLn+2-axiomatizable extension
of EA and S provably contains U , then U + RS,n+1 is a Π
L
n+1-conservative
extension of the theory U + {RkS,n : k < ω}.
Remark 4.7 The proofs of Theorems 2 and 4 are formalizable in EA+,
which leads to EA+-provable conservativity of the respective pairs of theo-
ries. The essential ingredient that required the use of superexponentiation
axiom was the application of the cut-elimination theorem for first order
logic. Well-known superexponential lower bounds on the speed-up of proofs
of Π2-statements of IΣ1 w.r.t. PRA show that the use of superexponentiation
axiom here is really necessary [39, 27].
As another corollary we obtain a new proof of a theorem due to Henryk
Kotlarski [31] characterizing arithmetical consequences of global reflection.
In a recent paper, M.  Le lyk [36] proved that ∆0(T)-induction is equivalent
to the global reflection principle T-RFN(EA) over the extension of EA by
the full compositional axioms for truth. (This result was also claimed by
Kotlarski, but later a gap was found in his proof of reflection by induction.)
A somewhat more general result is as follows.
Corollary 4.8 (Kotlarski theorem) Let U be an r.e. extension of EA in
the language of EA. Then U + CT + I∆0(T) is conservative over EA +
RFN
ω(U) for arithmetical sentences.
Proof. Let UTB denote UTBL where L is the language of EA, and let
S be U + UTB. Clearly, S is provably conservative over U . Note that
UTB+Σ1(T)-RFN(S) contains S and is sufficient to derive all compositional
axioms as well as I∆0(T), whence
U + CT+ I∆0(T) ⊆ UTB+Σ1(T)-RFN(S) ⊆Π1(T) UTB+ R
ω
S,1,
where the latter conservation holds by Theorem 4 for the language L(T).
Then one shows that the theory UTB + RnS,1 is conservative over EA +
RFN
n(U) for arithmetical sentences by induction on n using Corollary 3.6
(formalized in EA). We obtain that UTB + RωS,1 is conservative over EA +
RFN
ω(U), whence the result follows. ✷
Open question. By the results of Kotlarski and  Le lyk the theory EA +
CT+ I∆0(T) is equivalent to
EA + CT+ T-RFN(EA) ≡ EA + CT+∆0(T)-RFN(EA + UTB).
Is this theory equivalent to EA + UTB+Σ1(T)-RFN(EA + UTB)?
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5 Theories of iterated truth and reflection
Consider the language Lα := L ∪ {Tβ | β < α}, where L is the arithmetic
language (or its extension by finitely many predicate symbols). We assume
fixed an elementary well-ordering representing ordinals up to α. This order-
ing determines a natural Go¨del numbering of all objects of Lα.
We interpret Tβ as the truth definition for the language Lβ (note that L0
is the language of arithmetic). For each α we define an Lα+1-theory UTBα
as UTBLα . Also define
UTB<α :=
⋃
β<α
UTBβ, UTB6α := UTB<α + UTBα.
Even though the language of EA + UTB6α is, in general, infinite, this
theory can be considered as a definitional extension of a theory EA+UTB∗6α
formulated in the language L(Tα) with a single truth predicate.
Indeed, for each formula ϕ ∈ Lα+1 let ϕ
∗ denote the result of substitution
Tβ(t)/Tα(pTβ(t)q), for all subformulas Tβ(t) of ϕ and all β < α. This is
obviously a first-order interpretation of Lα+1 into L(Tα) preserving L(Tα)-
formulas. Let UTB∗6α be axiomatized by {ϕ
∗ : ϕ ∈ UTB6α}. Then, the
following lemma is easy to verify.
Lemma 5.1 For all ϕ ∈ Lα+1,
(i) EA + UTBα ⊢ ϕ↔ ϕ
∗;
(ii) EA + UTB6α ⊢ ϕ iff EA+ UTB
∗
6α ⊢ ϕ
∗.
We remark that UTB∗6α has a Π
L
2 (Tα)-axiomatization, since (·)
∗ maps Π
Lα+1
2 -
formulas to ΠL2 (Tα)-formulas.
The following lemma is easy to prove by a model-theoretic argument,
however we need a proof formalizable in EA. Such a proof is only slightly
longer and based on a standard idea.
Lemma 5.2 EA+ UTB<α conservatively extends EA+ UTB<β for β < α.
Proof. It is sufficient to construct a non-relativizing interpretation of any
finite subtheory of UTB<α in UTB<β. Consider such a fragment U . Let
α1 < α2 < · · · < αn be all the indices of truth predicates occurring in U
with αi > β. It is easy to translate Tαi into the language Lβ(Tα1 , . . . ,Tαi−1)
by case distinction:
T
∗
αi
(x) :=
∨
j<ki
∃~y (x = pϕj(~y)q ∧ ϕj(~y)).
Here ϕj(~y), for j < ki, are all the formulas for which the Tarski bicondition-
als for Tαi occur in U . Clearly, the translations of all these biconditionals
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are provable just from the axioms of EA (in the extended language). Let us
denote this interpretation Ki.
Now one can argue by induction on i and prove that the part of U in
the language Lβ(Tα1 , . . . ,Tαi−1) is interpretable in EA + UTB<β. This is
clear for i = 0. Assuming that K is such an interpretation for i, consider
the composition of Ki and K. ✷
Let us now fix an elementary well-ordering (Λ, <) and let UTB := UTB<Λ.
This ordinal notation system can be extended to a slightly larger segment
of ordinals up to ω(1+Λ), e.g., by encoding ordinals ωα+n as pairs 〈α, n〉.
We introduce the following classes of formulas corresponding to the levels of
the hyperarithmetical hierarchy up to ω(1 + Λ):4
• Πn := Π
L
n if n < ω;
• Πω(1+α)+n := Π
Lα
n+1(Tα);
• Π<λ :=
⋃
α<λΠα for limit λ.
Even though the classes Πα are formulated, generally speaking, in an in-
finite language, we can often restrict the language to a single truth predicate.
From Lemma 5.1 we obtain
Lemma 5.3 (i) Each ∆Lα0 (Tα)-formula is equivalent to a ∆
L
0 (Tα)-formula
in EA+ UTBα;
(ii) Each ΠLαn (Tα)-formula is equivalent to a Π
L
n(Tα)-formula in EA +
UTBα;
(iii) Each Lα-formula is equivalent to a Π<ω(1+α)-formula in EA+UTB<α.
We define the reflection operators, for all α, λ < ω(1 + Λ), λ ∈ Lim, as
follows:
Rα(S) := Π1+α-RFN(S),
R<λ(S) := Π<λ-RFN(S) if λ ∈ Lim.
Note that for n < ω we obtain the usual arithmetical reflection principles
Rn(S) ≡ RFNΠn+1(S). Further, by Lemma 5.3 we have
Proposition 5.4 (i) If S provably contains EA+UTBα, then over EA+
UTBα
Rω(1+α)+n(S) ≡ Π
L
n+1(Tα)-RFN(S);
4According to this definition Π1+α corresponds to Π1(0
(α))-sets. Many of the formulas
below would be simpler if Πn would denote Π1+n, but we chose to stick to the standard
notation.
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(ii) If S provably contains EA+UTBα and β = ω(1 + α) + n, then Rβ(S)
is finitely axiomatizable over EA+ UTBα;
(iii) If S provably contains EA+ UTB<α, then over EA+ UTB<α
R<ω(1+α)(S) ≡ Lα-RFN(S) ≡ {Rβ(S) | β < ω(1 + α)}.
We only remark that Statement (ii) follows from (i) and Theorem 3.
By ≡α and ≡<λ we denote conservativity for Π1+α-sentences and Π<λ-
sentences, respectively. The following conservation results obtained from
Theorems 1 and 4 hold provably in EA+ and together play the main technical
role in our treatment.
Theorem 5 Let λ = ω(1 + α) and S provably contain EA + UTBα. Over
EA+ UTB, Rλ(S) ≡<λ R<λ(S).
Proof. Firstly, UTB + Rλ(S) is conservative over UTB6α + Rλ(S). Since
UTB<α is axiomatized by Lα-formulas, Theorem 1 is applicable. Therefore,
EA + UTB6α + Rλ(S) is Lα-conservative over EA + UTB<α + Lα-RFN(S).
✷
We remark that the same theorem works over any extension of UTB by
Π<λ-sentences.
Theorem 6 Let V be a Π1+α+1-axiomatized extension of EA + UTB and
let S contain V . Then, over V , Rα+1(S) ≡α {Rα(S),Rα(S + Rα(S)), . . . }.
Proof. Let U ⊆ Π1+α+1 be such that V = UTB + U . If α is finite, then
V + Rα+1(S) is an L-conservative extension of U + Rα+1(S). Hence, the
result follows from Theorem 4 for L, which amounts to the usual reduction
property in arithmetic [2, Theorem 2].
Suppose α = ω(1 + β) + n, for some β and n, then V + Rα+1(S) is
a conservative extension of U + UTB6β + Rα+1(S). Theorem 4 does not
directly apply in this situation, since the language of UTB6β might be in-
finite. However, by Lemma 5.1, UTB6β is a conservative extension of a
theory U ′ := UTB∗6β formulated in the language L(Tβ). Moreover, U
′ has
a ΠL2 (Tβ)-axiomatization. By Theorem 4, U + U
′ + Rα+1(S) is a Π1+α-
conservative extension of U +U ′+ {Rα(S),Rα(S +Rα(S)), . . . }. Since U
′ is
contained in UTB, we obtain the result. ✷
6 Reflection calculus
We refer the reader to a note [8] for a short introduction to strictly posi-
tive logic sufficient for the present paper and to [30] for more information
from a general algebraic perspective. For background on modal logic and
provability logic we refer to the books [11, 44, 10].
18
6.1 The system RCΛ
Fix an ordinal (notation system) (Λ, <). Consider a modal language with
propositional variables p, q,. . . , a constant ⊤ and connectives ∧ and α, for
each ordinal α < Λ (understood as diamond modalities). Strictly positive
formulas (or simply formulas) are built up by the grammar:
A ::= p | ⊤ | (A ∧A) | αA, where α < Λ.
Sequents are expressions of the form A ⊢ B where A,B are strictly positive
formulas. The system RCΛ is given by the following axioms and rules:
1. A ⊢ A; A ⊢ ⊤; if A ⊢ B and B ⊢ C then A ⊢ C;
2. A ∧B ⊢ A; A ∧B ⊢ B; if A ⊢ B and A ⊢ C then A ⊢ B ∧ C;
3. if A ⊢ B then αA ⊢ αB;
4. ααA ⊢ αA;
5. αA ⊢ βA for α > β;
6. αA ∧ βB ⊢ α(A ∧ βB) for α > β.
The system RCω is the familiar system RC introduced in an equational
logic format by Dashkov [15], the present formulation is from [6].5 Dashkov
showed that RC axiomatizes the set of all sequents A ⊢ B such that the
implication A → B is provable in Japaridze’s polymodal provability logic
GLP. Moreover, unlike GLP itself, RC is polytime decidable and enjoys the
finite frame property (whereas GLP is Kripke incomplete) [15].
The system RCΛ is a straightforward generalization of RC to transfinitely
many modalities. It relates to a version of GLP with transfinitely many
modalities GLPΛ in the same way as RC relates to GLP. The system GLPΛ
was introduced in [5] and further studied in several papers by Joost Joosten
and David Ferna´ndez–Duque (see [14, 22]).
If L is a strictly positive logic, we write A ⊢L B for the statement that
the sequent A ⊢ B is provable in L, and A =L B stands for A ⊢L B and
B ⊢L A. When context allows we will often omit the subscript.
Notice that RCΛ proves the following polytransitivity principles: if α > β
then αβA ⊢ ββA ⊢ βA and βαA ⊢ ββA ⊢ βA. Also, the converse of Axiom 6
is provable in RCΛ, so that in fact we have
α(A ∧ βB) =RCΛ αA ∧ βB. (6)
We also mention the following properties:
5The system RCω considered in [7] is a proper extension of RC and is different both
from RCω and RCω+1.
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• If ω 6 Λ < Ω then RCΩ conservatively extends RCΛ.
• Derivability problem in RCΛ is polytime reducible to the problem of
comparison of ordinal notations in (Λ, <).
The first claim can be proved by an easy syntactic argument, see also [1]
where it is done for GLPΛ. The second claim is based on the result of
Dashkov [15] on the polytime decidability of RC. Since we are working in
this paper with elementary well-orderings Λ, we can therefore assume that
RCΛ is elementary decidable.
6.2 Variable-free fragment of RCΛ
Let RC0Λ denote the fragment of RCΛ without propositional variables. For-
mulas of RC0Λ will serve for us as canonical ordinal notations. This has been
studied quite carefully, so we only briefly recall some basic facts all of which
can be found in [5].
Let FΛ denote the set of all variable-free RCΛ-formulas, and let F
Λ
α denote
its restriction to the signature {β : α 6 β < Λ}, so that FΛ = FΛ0 . For each
α < Λ we define binary relations <Λα on F
Λ by
A <Λα B
def
⇐⇒ B ⊢RCΛ αA.
Obviously, <Λα is a transitive relation invariantly defined on the equivalence
classes w.r.t. provable equivalence in RCΛ. Since RCΛ is elementarily decid-
able, so are both =RCΛ and all of <
Λ
α .
Since RCΩ conservatively extends RCΛ for ω 6 Λ < Ω, the structure
(FΛ, <Λα) is isomorphic to an initial substructure of (F
Ω, <Ωα). Therefore, it
will be convenient for us in this section to fix a maximal possible Λ, that
is, to think about Λ as the class of all ordinals.6 Notationally we will not
carry the subscript Λ any longer and will refer to RCΛ and RC
0
Λ simply as
RC and RC0, respectively.
An RC-formula without variables and ∧ is called a word (or a worm in
some treatments). In fact, any such formula syntactically is a finite sequence
of letters α (followed by ⊤). If A,B are words then AB will denote A[⊤/B],
that is, the word corresponding to the concatenation of these sequences.
A ⊜ B denotes the graphical identity of formulas (words).
The set of all words will be denotedW, andWα will denote its restriction
to the signature {β : β > α}. The following facts are from [5]:
• Every A ∈ Fα is RC-equivalent to a word in Wα;
• (Wα/=RC, <α) is well-ordered. In fact, all these structures are order
isomorphic to the class of all ordinals.
6One can also choose the first uncountable ordinal as Λ.
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In order to compute the order types of words we recall the standard
Veblen hierarchy (see [38]). Given a class X ⊆ On let enX denote its enu-
merating function. Let X ′ denote the class of fixed points of enX , that is,
X ′ = {α ∈ On : enX(α) = α}. Define by transfinite induction on α the
so-called critical classes:
Cr0 = {ω
1+α : α ∈ On};
Crα+1 = Cr
′
α;
Crλ =
⋂
α<λ
Crα, if λ is a limit ordinal.
Let ϕα be the enumerating function of Crα. In particular, ϕ0(α) = ω
1+α and
ϕ1 enumerates the fixed points of ϕ0, that is, ϕ1(α) = εα. Our definition
of Cr0 and ϕ0 deviates slightly from the standard one, because we start
counting with ω, not with 1. However, this does not change the definitions
of Crα for α > 0.
It is easy to verify that for all α the classes Crα are closed and unbounded,
and that the functions ϕα are increasing and continuous. The least ordinal
α such that α ∈ Crα is the Feferman–Schu¨tte ordinal Γ0. It can also be
characterized as the limit of the sequence ϕ0(0), ϕϕ0(0)(0), . . . , in other
words, as the first ordinal closed under the operation α 7→ ϕα(0).
Let o(A) denote the order type of the word A in (W/=RC, <0). If X is
a class of words, we denote o(X) := {o(A) : A ∈ X}. We also denote by
α ↑ A the result of replacing each letter β of A by α+β and A+ := (1 ↑ A).
The following statements allow one to compute o(A) in terms of the
Veblen ϕ function [5].
1. If A ⊜ 0n then o(A) = n. If A ⊜ A+1 0A
+
2 0 · · · 0A
+
n , where not all Ai
are empty, then
o(A) = ωo(An) + · · · + ωo(A1).
2. o(W+ωα) = Crα, where W
+
β := Wβ \ {⊤}.
3. If A 6= ⊤, α > 0 and α = ωα1 + · · · + ωαn is in Cantor normal form,
then
o(α ↑ A) = ϕα1(. . . ϕαn(−1 + o(A)) . . . ).
This formula is based on item 2.
We note that Joosten and Ferna´ndez–Duque gave a different and nice
way to relate ordinal notations to a family of ordinal functions and the
Veblen hierarchy [22]. Their formulas based on hyperexponential functions
can be used here instead of 1–3. A general advantage of the kind of proof-
theoretic analysis that we are doing is that it is modular: we treat words
as ordinal notations themselves, we know that the ordering we use is well-
founded and naturally computable. So, the treatment of Veblen functions
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only serves the purpose of relating these notations to other more familiar
systems and for our self-control. The reader can use instead the functions
and the treatment of notations by Ferna´ndez-Duque and Joosten.
6.3 Reflection algebras
Fix an ordinal notation system (Λ, <) and the corresponding language LΛ
as in Section 5. We interpret reflection calculus RCΛ in the semilattice GS
of Go¨delian extensions of S where S provably contains EA+UTB. In doing
that we technically follow the treatments in [7, 9] where the reader can look
for additional details.
Fix some base theory S, which we suppose to be closed under the Σ1-
collection rule. We write S1 6S S2 iff S1 S-provably extends S2, that is,
S ⊢ ∀x (✷S2(x)→ ✷S1(x)).
We write S1 =S S2 iff S1 6S S2 and S2 6S S1. The set of all Go¨delian
theories provably extending S modulo =S is a lattice GS where the meet
S1∧S S2 corresponds to the (naturally defined) union of theories. Reflection
principles Rα defined in Section 5 induce, for each α, monotone and semi-
idempotent operators acting on GS , provided S contains EA + UTB.
Definition 1 Reflection algebra of S is the structure of semilattice with
operators (GS ;∧S ,⊤S , (Rα)α<Λ).
Reflection algebras yield a natural interpretation of the language of RCΛ:
RCΛ-formulas are sent to (equivalence classes of) Go¨delian theories in GS in
such a way that ⊤ corresponds to ⊤S, ∧ corresponds to the union of theories
∧S, and α corresponds to Rα, for each α < Λ.
An arithmetical interpretation in GS is a map ∗ from RCΛ-formulas to
GS satisfying the following conditions:
• ⊤∗ = S; (A ∧B)∗ = (A∗ ∧S B
∗);
• (αA)∗ = Rα(A
∗), for all α < Λ.
Using Lemma 4.1 we verify the following basic theorem.
Theorem 7 For all formulas A,B of RCΛ, if A ⊢RCΛ B then A
∗ 6S B
∗,
for all arithmetical interpretations ∗ in GS.
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the length of a derivation in RCΛ.
We only check the nontrivial case of Axiom 6 of RCΛ, which is based on the
finite axiomatizability of the schemata Rα.
We show, for all theories S1, S2 containing EA + UTB and all β < α,
Rα(S1) ∧ Rβ(S2) ⊢ Rα(S1 ∧ Rβ(S2)).
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Reasoning informally inside EA + UTB, assume ϕ ∈ Πα and S1 ∧ Rβ(S2) ⊢
ϕ(x). Using Theorem 5.4, let ψ ∈ Πβ denote a sentence equivalent to Rβ(S2),
then S1 ⊢ ψ → ϕ(x). By Rα(S1) we infer ψ → ϕ(x). Since EA + UTB +
Rβ(S2) ⊢ ψ, we conclude ϕ(x). ✷
Remark 6.1 It is natural to ask if RCΛ is complete w.r.t. the considered
arithmetical interpretation. We believe that for theories S containing Peano
arithmetic the positive answer can be obtained by the standard methods of
proving completeness of Japaridze’s provability logic GLP. However, we
have not worked out the details.
7 Conservation results for iterated reflection
In this section we prove our main conservation result, a Schmerl-type for-
mula, related to the ordinal analysis of systems of iterated reflection prin-
ciples. In the next section we will apply it to subsystems of second order
arithmetic. We will follow the treatment in [9] which is quite general and
deals with iterations of arbitrary computable, monotone, semi-idempotent
operators. All the operators Rα satisfy these conditions, so the results of
Section 5 of [9] apply. We summarize what we need in the following theorem.
Consider any ordinal notation system (that is, an elementary strict pre-
wellordering) (D,≺, 0) and any Go¨delian theory U in GS .
Proposition 7.1 We can specify an elementary formula ρ(α, β, x) defining
a family of Go¨delian theories Rβα(U) in GS, where β ∈ D and α ∈ Λ,
satisfying the following conditions provably in EA: R0α(U) ≡ U and, if β ≻ 0,
R
β
α(U) ≡
⋃
{Rα(R
γ
α(U)) : γ ≺ β}. (7)
Moreover, theories Rβα(U) are unique modulo provable equivalence in EA.
We will take as (D,≺, 0) the pre-wellorderings (Wα, <α,⊤) for various
α. We denote by oα(A) the (Go¨del number of a) word A considered as
an element of this notation system. Accordingly, R
oα(A)
β (S) denotes the
corresponding iteration of Rβ applied to S.
We now consider an elementary well-ordering (Λ, <) and denote by IB<Λ,
or simply IB, the theory EA+ + UTB<Λ. We fix a Go¨delian extension S of
IB and work in GS . Let A
∗
S denote the interpretation of a word A in GS .
Theorem 8 Suppose S is a Π1+α+1-axiomatized extension of IB. Provably
in EA+, for all A ∈Wα,
S +A∗S ≡α S + R
oα(A)
α (S).
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Proof. We will use reflexive induction on A ∈ Wα in EA
+. The reflexive
induction hypothesis states
∀B <α A ✷EA+(S +B
∗
S ≡α S + R
oα(B)
α (S)),
which implies
∀B <α A Rα(B
∗
S) =EA+ Rα(R
oα(B)
α (S)).
We prove S + A∗S ≡α S + R
oα(A)
α (S) using the induction hypothesis and
reasoning informally over S. We are going to use formalized versions of
Theorems 5 and 6, which are available in EA and EA+, respectively.
First, we prove that S + A∗S contains R
oα(A)
α (S). If B <α A then
A ⊢RCΛ αB and hence A
∗
S 6S Rα(B
∗
S) by the soundness theorem. By the
induction hypothesis Rα(B
∗
S) implies Rα(R
oα(B)
α (S)). Hence, ∀B <α A A
∗
S ⊢
Rα(R
oα(B)
α (S)), and A∗S ⊢ R
oα(A)
α (S) by (7).
Second, we prove Π1+α-conservation. Assume π ∈ Π1+α and S+A
∗
S ⊢ π.
We consider the following cases according to the first letter in A.
Case 1. A ⊜ αB. Then Rα(B
∗
S) ⊢ π and Rα(R
oα(B)
α (S)) ⊢ π by the
reflexive induction hypothesis. Since B <α A we obtain R
oα(A)
α (S) ⊢ π.
Case 2. A ⊜ (β + 1)B with β > α. We define RCΛ-formulas Q
β
k(p) by:
Qβ0 (p) := p, Q
β
k+1(p) := β(p ∧Q
β
k(p)).
Then, by Theorem 6, since S is Π1+α+1-axiomatized over UTB,
S + Rβ+1(B
∗
S) ≡β S +
⋃
{Qβk (B)
∗
S : k < ω}.
It follows that S + Qβk(B)
∗
S ⊢ π, for some k. We have Q
β
k(B) <α A, hence
γ := oα(Q
β
k(B)) < oα(A). By the reflexive induction hypothesis we obtain
Rα(R
γ
α(S)) ⊢ Rα(Q
β
k(B)
∗
S) ⊢ Rα(π) ⊢ π. It follows that S + R
oα(A)
α (S) ⊢
Rα(R
γ
α(S)) ⊢ π, q.e.d.
Case 3. A ⊜ λB where λ > α and λ ∈ Lim. It follows that λ > α + 1
and S is axiomatized by Π<λ-sentences over UTB. By Theorem 5, over S,
Rλ(B
∗
S) ≡<λ
⋃
{Rβ(B
∗
S) : α 6 β < λ}.
Hence, there is a β such that α 6 β < λ and Rβ(B
∗
S) ⊢ π. It follows
that Rα(Rβ(B
∗
S)) ⊢ Rα(π) ⊢ π. Since βB <α A we obtain R
oα(A)
α (S) ⊢
Rα(R
oα(βB)
α (S)). By the reflexive induction hypothesis
Rα(R
oα(βB)
α (S)) ⊢ Rα(Rβ(B
∗
S)) ⊢ π.
✷
This theorem is the main result of this paper. It allows one to easily
calculate proof-theoretic ordinals and conservativity spectra for many the-
ories that can be related to progressions of iterated reflection principles of
the considered kind. This is explained in more detail in the next section.
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8 Proof-theoretic analysis by iterated reflection
8.1 Stating ordinal analysis results
Theorem 8 provides a way to obtain several types of results usually called
proof-theoretic analyses of formal systems of predicative strength. The type
of results for a given system T one is traditionally interested in include:
(i) Consistency proof for T by transfinite induction along a natural ele-
mentary well-ordering;
(ii) Characterization of the class of provably total computable functions
of T ;
(iii) Characterization of the order types of elementary (or primitive recur-
sive) well-orderings whose well-foundedness is provable in T .
It is well-known that all these questions can be reduced to the one of
characterizing the set of consequences of T of an appropriate logical com-
plexity class in terms of progressions of iterated reflection principles. More
specifically, proof-theoretic analysis of a theory T by iterated reflection can
be stated as a conservation result
T ≡α R
β
α(S), (8)
for a suitably weak initial theory S (such as EA or IB) and appropriate
ordinal notations α (such as α = 0, 1 or ω) and β. If the relation (8)
holds, then T is called Π1+α-regular and β is called its Π1+α-ordinal (details
are spelled out below). Naturally occurring theories T are, indeed, usually
regular.
Theorems of the form (8) appeared for the first time in the work of Ulf
Schmerl [41, 42] who showed among other things that, for any n < ω and a
natural ordinal notation system for ε0,
PA ≡n R
ε0
n (PRA).
The method was further developed in [2]. Here we briefly recall basic rela-
tionships with the more traditional kinds of proof-theoretic analyses associ-
ated with logical complexity levels Π01, Π
0
2 and Π
1
1.
Consistency proofs, as in (i), can be obtained from a characterization
of arithmetical Π01-consequences of T in terms of iterated consistency asser-
tions. For example, if T ≡0 R
α
0 (EA) holds provably in EA
+ and α is a limit
ordinal, then
EA+ ⊢ Con(T )↔ ∀β < α Rβ0 (EA).
Since EA+ proves RFNΣ1(EA), we have
EA+ ⊢ ∀β (∀γ < β Rγ0(EA)→ R
β
0 (EA)).
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Hence, transfinite induction up to α over EA+ is sufficient to derive ∀β <
α Rβ0 (EA) and Con(T ). In fact, this argument only requires the use of
transfinite induction rule for a specific Π1 (or even a ∆0) formula.
A characterization of the class F(T ) of provably total computable func-
tions of T in terms of the fast growing hierarchy of functions, as in (ii),
follows from a characterization of Π02-consequences of T in terms of iterated
uniform Π02-reflection principles over EA. These claims are elaborated in [2],
here we state a quick summary.
With an elementary well-ordering (Ω, <) (canonical or not) one can as-
sociate a hierarchy of fast-growing functions Fα : N→ N for all α < Ω:
Fα(x) := max {2
x
x + 1} ∪ {F
(m)
β (n) + 1 : β ≺ α, β,m, n 6 x}.
We define Fα as the elementary closure of {Fβ : β ≺ α}. These classes are the
same as the standard fast growing hierarchy classes for systems of ordinal
notation with a reasonable fundamental sequences assignment (see [40]),
however they are defined even when the latter are not available. Then the
following theorem holds [2]:
Proposition 8.1 (i) F(Rα1 (EA)) = Fα;
(ii) If S ≡1 R
α
1 (EA) then F(S) = Fα.
Notice that Claim (ii) follows from (i).
Now we turn to the characterization of the supremum of order types of
T -provably well-founded elementary well-orderings, as in (iii), aka the proof-
theoretic Π11-ordinal of T . A recent paper by Pakhomov and Walsh [37]
provides a general result characterizing this ordinal in terms of progres-
sions of iterated Π11-reflection principles in the language of second order
arithmetic. Equivalently, it can be stated in terms of iterated full uniform
reflection principles in the language of first order arithmetic enriched by a
free predicate letter X.
The present setup specifically allows for the extension of the language
of the initial theory by a free predicate letter. Hence, in this context Π11-
analysis amounts to ΠX<ω-analysis of a formal system in the language withX.
The following proposition is a consequence of Theorem 5.9 and Lemma 4.15
of [37].
Proposition 8.2 (i) The Π11-ordinal of R
1+α
<ω (EA
X) is εα;
(ii) If S ≡<ω R
1+α
<ω (EA
X) then the Π11-ordinal of S is εα.
As before, Claim (ii) directly follows from Claim (i).
Summing up our short discussion ordinal analysis we see that it is advan-
tageous to state ordinal analysis results in the form (8), for these conserva-
tivity relationships yield all the main types of results found in the literature
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and sometimes, especially in complexity Π01, provide sharper characteriza-
tions. It is a different matter how one can obtain results such as (8).
Conservation results can be obtained by a variety of proof- and model-
theoretic methods. However, technical details can sometimes become sim-
pler if one uses methods adapted to deal with reflection principles. The role
of reflection algebras is just that, as explained in the next subsection.
8.2 The use of reflection algebras for proof-theoretic analysis
Proof-theoretic analyses such as (i)–(iii) above can be obtained by the fol-
lowing two steps:
1. For a given theory T we either find an axiomatization by a finite
combination of reflection principles A∗S over a chosen basic system S
(such as EA or EA+ + UTB in our case) or reduce T to a theory U
of this form (that is, prove an apropriate partial conservation result
between T and U).
2. Reduce A∗S to a transfinite iteration of reflection principles of a par-
ticular complexity class, such as Π1, Π2, or Π
X
<ω. In our case this is
achieved by Theorem 8 and this ordinal will be equal to oα(A), for
some α, typically α = 0, 1 or ω, and some A ∈Wα.
We remark that Step 1 above is, in practice, relatively easy, since for
natural theories T suitable reflection principles are often well-known. The
main difficulty in applying these methods is in Step 2, which depends on the
overall structure of reflection principles of various complexity levels not to
contain big ‘gaps’. Theorem 8 is based on the two main conservation results
(Theorems 5 and 6) that can be seen as stating that there are no such gaps.
This idea was first applied to Peano arithmetic and its fragments where
Japaridze’s polymodal provability logic GLP was used instead of the re-
flection calculus RC [3, 4]. It was later remarked that for these kind of
applications the strictly positive fragment of GLP axiomatized by RC is
sufficient and allows for a simpler treatment [6].
8.3 A case study: Analysis of ACA
This method of analysis, in the simplest situation going beyond Peano arith-
metic, can be illustrated by the well-known example of the second order
theory ACA. This system extends PA by the schemata of induction, for all
second order formulas, and by the comprehension schema:
∃Y ∀x (x ∈ Y ↔ ϕ(x)), (9)
for each arithmetical formula ϕ (possibly with first- and second-order pa-
rameters but not containing Y as a parameter).
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It is well-known that ACA is ω-mutually-interpretable with the extension
of EA in the language L(T) by the full induction schema together with the
compositional axioms for truth (see e.g. [25]). We denote the latter theory
PA(T) := EA+ CT+ IL(T). One way, the interpretation works by defining
the domain of set variables by an elementary formula Set(e) expressing “e
is the Go¨del number of an arithmetical formula with one free variable”, and
by letting
x ∈ e
def
⇐⇒ Set(e) ∧ T(e(x)).
The other way, the interpretation works by defining in ACA a ∆11 truth
predicate for arithmetical formulas (see, e.g., [45] or Appendix A of this
paper).
By Lemma 2.4, full induction in L(T) follows from full reflection. Vice
versa, the standard argument based on cut-elimination shows that full induc-
tion in the presence of CT proves full reflection. Let S := EA+ + UTBL(T).
We have already noted that the compositional axioms are provable from
Σ1(T)-RFN(S) over S. Thus,
PA(T) ≡ S + L(T)-RFN(S).
The latter theory is the same as
S + R<ω2(S) ≡<ω2 S + Rω2(S).
Hence, we can apply Theorem 8 to S + Rω2(S). Note that oω((ω2)⊤) =
o(ω⊤) = ε0. Therefore, Theorem 8 yields that PA(T) is conservative over
S+Rε0ω (S) for Πω-sentences. The latter theory is conservative over ε0 times
iterated arithmetical uniform reflection over EA+ (or equivalently over PA).
This gives a characterization of arithmetical consequences of PA(T) and of
ACA. The same reasoning, when carried out in the language with a free
predicate letter X, yields the well-known bound εε0 on the provably well-
founded elementary orderings in ACA, by [37].
We also obtain that on((ω2)⊤) = o((ω2)⊤)) = ϕ1(ϕ1(0)) = εε0 , for all
n < ω. Hence, by Theorem 8 PA(T) is a Πn+1-conservative extension of
EA+ + R
εε0
n (EA
+), for each n < ω. This shows, in particular, that Π01-
consequences of ACA are axiomatized by εε0 times iterated consistency over
EA+. Similarly, the class of provably total computable functions of ACA is
the εε0-th class of the extended Grzegorczyk hierarchy.
Similarly, one can analyze subtheories of PA(T) defined by restricted
induction. These theories have been studied by Kotlarski and Ratajczyk [32]
who obtained a characterization of their arithmetical consequences in terms
of iterated arithmetical uniform reflection principles.
By relativization of the usual proof in arithmetic we have that EA +
CT+ IΣn(T) is equivalent to S +Πn+2(T)-RFN(S). Note that we need CT
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to infer reflection from induction, but Σ1(T)-reflection over UTB already
implies CT. Therefore,
EA + CT+ IΣn(T) ≡ S + Rω+n+1(S) ≡ω S + R
ωn+1
ω (S).
We have oω((ω + n + 1)⊤) = o((n + 1)⊤) = ωn+1, where ω0 = 1, and
ωn+1 = ω
ωn . Hence, EA + IΣn(T) is conservative over ωn+1-fold iteration
of arithmetical uniform reflection over EA.
Now we can remark that, under the standard interpretation of the second
order language in L(T), arithmetical formulas with set parameters are trans-
lated into ∆0(T)-formulas, and hence Σ
1
n-formulas are translated to Σn(T)-
formulas. Hence, EA+ CT+ IΣn(T) interprets ACA0 + IΣ
1
n. Therefore, its
Π<ω-ordinal is bounded by ωn+1, and Π
0
1+m-ordinal by om((ω+ n+1)⊤) =
o((ω + n+ 1)⊤) = ϕ1(ϕ
(n+1)
0 (0)) = εωn+1 .
Applications to theories of iterated arithmetical comprehension will be
more comprehensively presented in Section 9.
8.4 Conservativity spectra
The notions of Π01+n-ordinal [2] and conservativity spectrum [28, 8] can be
naturally generalized to the classes of the hyperarithmetical hierarchy.
Let us fix, as before, an elementary well-ordering Λ and the correspond-
ing language LΛ. By IBα we denote the extension of EA
+ by the axioms
UTB6α, and IB<α denotes the union of theories IBβ for all β < α. We will
consider iterations of reflection principles along another elementary well-
ordering that need not be related to Λ. Let us fix such a well-ordering
Ω.
Definition 2 Let S be a Go¨delian extension of IB.
• (lower) Π1+α-ordinal of S, denoted ordα(S), is the supremum of all
β ∈ Ω such that S ⊢ Rβα(IB);
• upper Π1+α-ordinal of S, denoted ord
u
α(S), is the infinum of all β ∈ Ω
such that S is Π1+α-conservative over R
β
α(IB);
• S is Π1+α-regular if lower and upper Π1+α-ordinals of S coincide, that
is, ordα(S) = ord
u
α(S).
As for finite α, Π1+α-ordinals are insensitive to Π1+α-conservative ex-
tensions and to extensions by consistent Σ1+α-axioms.
Proposition 8.3 For for all α < ω(1 + Λ),
(i) If T is Π1+α-conservative over S then ordα(S) > ordα(T );
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(ii) Suppose S is Π1+α-regular. If T is axiomatized by Σ1+α-sentences and
S ∪ T is consistent, then ordα(S ∪ T ) = ordα(S).
Proof. We prove the first claim using the fact that Rβα(IB) is a Π1+α-
axiomatized extension of IB. The second claim follows from the well-known
result that Rα(U) is not contained in any consistent Σ1+α-axiomatized ex-
tension of U . ✷
The sequence of Π1+n-ordinals of a given system S is sometimes called its
conservativity spectrum. This sequence bears the more detailed information
about the strength of a given theory at various levels of logical complexity
than any individual proof-theoretic ordinal. Joost Joosten [28] studied such
sequences for finite n. He showed for theories between EA+ and PA that
their conservativity spectra correspond to decreasing sequences of ordinals
below ε0 of a certain kind, that is, to the points of the so-called Ignatiev
frame. Beklemishev [9] showed that the set of spectra naturally bears the
structure of an RC-algebra with conservativity operators. An immediate
generalization of conservativity spectra in arithmetic is as follows.
Definition 3 Conservativity spectrum of S is the sequence (αξ)ξ<ω(1+Λ)
such that αξ = ordξ(S), for all ξ.
More explicitly, we can call it the ω(1 + Λ)-conservativity spectrum of S.
As an example consider the theory ACA or PA(T). Since PA(T) is for-
mulated in Lω2, we consider its ω2-spectrum. As we have seen, this is the
sequence
(εε0 , εε0 , . . . ; ε0, ε0, . . . ).
Observe that if, for example, instead of PA(T) we consider the set of its
arithmetical consequences (axiomatized by ε0-fold iteration of arithmetical
uniform reflection principle), then its conservativity spectrum looks as fol-
lows:
(εε0 , εε0 , . . . ; 0, 0, . . . ).
We conjecture that in general conservativity spectra consist precisely
of ℓ-sequences in the sense of [14]. Therefore, they one-to-one correspond
the points of the generalized Ignatiev frames constructed by Ferna´ndez and
Joosten. However, proving this conjecture remains out of the scope of the
present paper.
9 Analysis of second order systems
In this section we show how Theorem 8 can be used to obtain ordinal analysis
of some systems of second order arithmetic of ‘predicative’ strength.
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9.1 Ordinal analysis of iterated arithmetical comprehension
For the purposes of this section we use as the ordinal notion system Λ any
natural elementary ordinal notation system that contains the symbol for
0, is closed under addition, function ωx, and the binary Veblen function
ϕx(y). We also assume that EA
+ is capable to prove standard universal
properties of this functions in the ordinal notation system, e.g., that addition
is associative, that ωα < ωβ iff α < β, that ϕα(ϕβ(γ)) = ϕβ(γ), for β > α,
etc. Note that it is well-known to be the case for the standard ordinal
notation systems for the ordinal Γ0.
The base theory of second-order arithmetic we consider is the well-known
theory ACA0, that is, the extension of EA by the scheme of arithmetic com-
prehension (9) and the axiom of set-induction
0 ∈ X ∧ ∀x (x ∈ X → S(x) ∈ X)→ ∀x (x ∈ X).
Due to our choice of base theory, we freely use pseudo-terms {x | F (x)},
when F (x) is a Π0∞-formula.
The are various ways how one could axiomatized the theory of iterated
Π01-comprehension (Π
0
1-CA0)α. Officially we will use the axiomatization that
extends ACA0 by the following scheme:
∃X∀β ≤ α ((X)β = {x | F (x, (X)<β)}), for Π
0
∞ formulas F (x,X); (10)
here (Y )β := {x : 〈β, x〉 ∈ Y } and (Y )<β := {x : ∃γ < β 〈γ, x〉 ∈ Y }.
However, in certain situations it will be useful for us to use a different
axiomatization that extends ACA0 by the axiom stating that for any set X
the α-th Turing jump X(α) exists.
We also consider the following theories
1. (Π01-CA)α := ACA+ (Π
0
1-CA0)α;
2. (Π01-CA0)<α := ACA0 +
⋃
β<α
(Π01-CA0)β;
3. (Π01-CA)<α := ACA+ (Π
0
1-CA0)<α.
Note that some usual systems are of this form: ACA0 ≡ (Π
0
1-CA0)1, ACA ≡
(Π01-CA)1, ACA
+
0 ≡ (Π
0
1-CA0)ω, and ACA
+ = (Π01-CA)ω.
Recall that the definitions of the theories UTB<α and UTB≤α required to
first fix the ground language L (that should be an extension of arithmetical
language by finitely many predicate symbols). In this section it will be suffi-
cient to only consider the case of L expanding the arithmetical language by
only one unary predicate symbol X(x). The inclusion of the free predicate
symbol is important for studying the Π11-consequences of second-order the-
ories. We identify the unary predicate letter X(x) with the set variable X
and the atomic formulas X(t) with the atomic formulas t ∈ X. This allows
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us to identify a Π11-sentence ∀Y ϕ(Y ) with the L-sentence ϕ(X) and to talk
about the sets of Π11-consequences of theories whose language contains L.
We define a translation EX(·) of the language LΛ into the language of
second-order arithmetic. The set variable X is the only parameter of the
translation. The translation EX(·) interprets symbols of arithmetical lan-
guage by themselves and the predicate X by the set X.
To define the interpretations EX(Tα(x)) of truth predicates we will use
partial truth predicates encoded by sets. Let v(x) be the term evaluation
function, i.e. the function that maps a Go¨del number of any closed term t in
the language of arithmetic to its numerical value. A set P of Go¨del numbers
of Lα sentences is called a compositional truth definiton for Lα over a set X
if the following conditions hold:
1. ϕ ∈ P ↔ ϕ, for any atomic arithmetic sentence ϕ;
2. X(t) ∈ P ↔ v(t) ∈ X, for for any closed term t;
3. Tβ(t) ∈ P ↔ v(t) ∈ Lβ ∧ v(t) ∈ P , for any closed term t and β < α;
4. (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ P ↔ ϕ ∈ P ∧ ψ ∈ P , for any sentences ϕ,ψ ∈ Lα;
5. (¬ϕ) ∈ P ↔ ϕ 6∈ P , for any sentence ϕ ∈ Lα;
6. (∀x ϕ(x)) ∈ P ↔ ∀x (ϕ(x) ∈ P ), for any ϕ(x) ∈ Lα;
In this case we write TPXα (P ). We finish the definition of EX by interpreting
the predicates Tα(x) as
∃β ≤ α (x ∈ Lβ ∧ ∀P (TP
X
β (P )→ x ∈ P )).
By this translation we will consider LΛ to be a sub-language of the
language of second-order arithmetic and will freely use expressions like S ≡α
U , where S is a second-order theory and U is an LΛ theory (or vice versa).
In terms of the translation EX(·) this means that for each Π1+α sentence ϕ
we have S ⊢ ∀X EX(ϕ) ⇐⇒ U ⊢ ϕ.
Now let us state our two central results connecting systems of second-
order arithmetic with the systems of iterated truth definitions.
Theorem 9 For α > 1,
(Π01-CA0)ωα ≡<ωα+1 R<ωα+1(IB)
Theorem 10 For α > 1,
(Π01-CA)ωα ≡<ωα+1+ω R<ωα+1+ω(IB).
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Before proving these two theorems we will elaborate on how the proof-
theoretic analysis for theories of iterated Π01-comprehension follows from the
two results and the discussion in Section 8.1.
Theorems 9 and 10 cover only the case of theories of β-times iterated
comprehension, where β is of the form ωα. But it is easy to reduce more
general case to this one. For an ordinal α with the Cantor normal form
ωα1 + . . . + ωαn the theories (Π01-CA0)α and (Π
0
1-CA)α coincide with the
theories (Π01-CA0)ωα1 and (Π
0
1-CA)ωα1 , respectively.
For the case of limit theories (Π01-CA0)<α and (Π
0
1-CA)<α, where αε1, by
a combination of compactness, Theorem 9, and Theorem 10 we have
(Π01-CA0)<α ≡<β R<β(IB), where β = sup{δω | δ < α}; (11)
(Π01-CA)<α ≡<β R<β(IB), where β = sup{δω + ω | δ < α}. (12)
Combining the observations above with Theorem 8 and computations
from Section 6.2 we get the following Schmerl-style formulas for the theories
of iterated Π01-comprehension:
Theorem 11 For α > 1,
1. (Π01-CA0)ωα ≡ (Π
0
1-CA0)<ωα+1 ≡β R
ϕα+1(0)
β (IB), for β < ω
α+1;
2. (Π01-CA)ωα ≡ (Π
0
1-CA)<ωα+1 ≡β R
ϕα+1(ε0)
β (IB), for β < ω
α+1;
3. (Π01-CA)ωα ≡ (Π
0
1-CA)<ωα+1 ≡β R
ε0
β (IB), for ω
α+1 ≤ β < ωα+1 + ω;
4. (Π01-CA0)<ωλ ≡β (Π
0
1-CA)<ωλ ≡β R
ϕλ(0)
β (IB), for limit λ and β < ω
λ.
Proof. Let us first prove Claim 1. By Theorem 9 and Theorem 8 we have
(Π01-CA0)ωα ≡ (Π
0
1-CA0)<ωα+1 ≡<ωα+1 R<ωα+1(IB) ≡β R
oβ(ω
α+1)
β (IB).
To finish the proof of Claim 1 we calculate
oβ(ω
α+1) = o(ωα+1) = ϕα+1(0),
where we use results of Section 6.2 and the fact that ωα+1 = β + ωα+1.
For Claims 2 and 3 by Theorem 10 and Theorem 8 we have
(Π01-CA)ωα ≡ (Π
0
1-CA)<ωα+1 ≡<ωα+1+ω R<ωα+1+ω(IB) ≡β R
oβ(ω
α+1+ω)
β (IB).
To prove Claim 2 we observe ωα+1 + ω = β + ωα+1 + ω whence
oβ(ω
α+1 + ω) = o(ωα+1 + ω) = ϕα+1(ϕ1(0)) = ϕα+1(ε0).
To prove Claim 3 we notice ωα+1 + ω = β + ω and thus oβ(ω
α+1 + ω) =
o(ω) = ε0.
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Let us prove Claim 4. Since ωλ = sup{δω | δ < ωλ} = sup{δω + ω | δ <
ωλ}, by (11) and (12) we obtain
(Π01-CA0)<ωλ ≡β (Π
0
1-CA)<ωλ ≡<ωλ R<ωλ(IB) ≡β R
oβ(ω
λ)
β (IB).
Clearly, oβ(ω
λ) = ϕλ(0).✷
Combining Theorem 11 with the results of Section 8.1 we obtain various
other ordinal analysis results.
Corollary 9.1 For α > 1,
1. Theory EA+ plus transfinite induction for ∆0-formulas up to ϕα+1(0)
proves the consistency of (Π01-CA0)ωα .
2. Theory EA+ plus transfinite induction for ∆0-formulas up to ϕα+1(ε0)
proves the consistency of (Π01-CA)ωα .
3. For limit λ the theory EA+ plus transfinite induction for ∆0-formulas
up to ϕλ(0) proves the consistency of (Π
0
1-CA0)<ωλ and (Π
0
1-CA)<ωλ .
Corollary 9.2 For α > 1,
1. F((Π01-CA0)ωα) = Fϕα+1(0);
2. F((Π01-CA)ωα) = Fϕα+1(ε0);
3. F((Π01-CA0)<ωλ) = F((Π
0
1-CA)<ωλ) = Fϕλ(0), for limit λ.
Corollary 9.3 For α > 1,
1. The Π11-ordinal of (Π
0
1-CA0)ωα is ϕα+1(0);
2. The Π11-ordinal of (Π
0
1-CA)ωα is ϕα+1(ε0);
3. For limit λ, the Π11-ordinal of (Π
0
1-CA0)<ωλ and (Π
0
1-CA)<ωλ is ϕλ(0).
Remark 9.4 In this section we have not covered the theories ACA0 =
(Π01-CA0)1 and ACA = (Π
0
1-CA)1. This is due to the fact that we wanted to
simplify our proofs and the cases of ACA0 and ACA require a separate con-
sideration (we already considered the case of ACA in Section 8.3). The main
reason for this complication is that the theories of iterated truth definitions
treat successor stages of hyperarthmetical hierarchy Πα+1 and limit stages
Πλ differently.
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9.2 Constructing a universe of sets from truth definitions
In this and next section we prove Theorems 9 and 10. The result of this
section are the following two lemmas.
Lemma 9.5 For any α,
(Π01-CA0)ω1+α ⊆<ω R<ω1+α+1(IB)
Lemma 9.6 For any α,
(Π01-CA)ω1+α ⊆<ω R<ω1+α+1+ω(IB).
Note that Lemmas 9.5 and 9.6 essentially are the parts of Theorems 9 and
10 that are sufficient to prove the upper bounds for Π11, Π
0
2, and Π
0
1 ordinals
of (Π01-CA0)ωα and (Π
0
1-CA)ωα .
As we will see, there is an essential difference between the conserva-
tion results of Lemma 9.5 and 9.6. We prove Lemma 9.5 by a model-
theoretic construction. Given a model M  R<ω1+α+1(IB) we construct a
model DEFωα+1(M)  (Π
0
1-CA0)ωα , where M and DEFωα+1(M) have the
same first-order arithmetical part. This does not lead to an interpretation of
(Π01-CA0)ωα in R<ω1+α+1(IB). Moreover, such an interpretation is impossible,
since (Π01-CA0)ωα is finitely axiomatizable and at the same time proves the
consistency of any finite subtheory of R<ω1+α+1(IB). On the other hand, we
prove Lemma 9.6 by constructing an ω-interpretation Dωα+1 of (Π
0
1-CA)ωα in
R<ω1+α+1+ω(IB). This ω-interpretation is provided by a formalized version
of the proof of Lemma 9.5.
For a model M of UTB<α we define a model of second-order arithmetic
DEFα(M). The arithmetical part of DEFα(M) coincides with the arith-
metical part of M. The second-order part of DEFα(M) consists of all the
subsets of M definable by Lα-formulas with parameters from M.
Proof of Lemma 9.5. It is enough to show that for anyM  R<ω1+α+1(IB)
the model DEFωα+1(M) satisfies (Π
0
1-CA0)ω1+α .
For an Lωα+1-formula ϕ(x) with parameters from M we denote by Dϕ
the set {a | M  ϕ(a)}. Clearly, each set A from DEFωα+1(M) is Dϕ
for some ϕ. Naturally, we can treat Π0∞ formulas ψ(~x) with parameters
fromDEFωα+1(M) as Lωα+1 formulas: We transform ψ to an Lωα+1-formula
by replacing the subformulas t ∈ Dϕ with ϕ(t). Moreover, we apply the
same treatment to arbitrary LΛ-formulas and use the formulas t ∈ Dϕ as
shorthands for ϕ(t). Since we talk about definable hierarchies, in addition
we will use formulas t ∈ (Dϕ)β as shorthands for ϕ(〈t, β〉) and formulas
t ∈ (Dϕ)<β as shorthands for ϕ(t) ∧ ∃γ < β∃x (t = 〈γ, x〉).
Since R<ω1+α+1(IB) proves induction for Lα formulas, we see that the
model DEFωα+1(M) satisfies the second-order induction axiom. Clearly,
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the result of comprehension for a Π0∞ formula ϕ(x) with parameters from
DEFωα+1(M) is the set Dϕ. Thus DEFωα+1(M)  ACA0.
To finish the proof of DEFωα+1(M)  (Π
0
1-CA0)ω1+α we need to show
that for any Π0∞ formula A(x, Y ) whose parameters are from DEFωα+1(M)
there is a set H ∈ DEFωα+1(M) such that
DEFωα+1(M)  (∀β < ω
1+α) ∀x (x ∈ (H)β ↔ A(x, (H)<β)). (13)
Let us fix some δ < ωα+1 such that all the set parameters of A are sets
defined by formulas from Lδ. By (a formalized version of) recursion theorem
we define Kalmar elementary sequence 〈ϕβ(x) | β ≤ ω
1+α〉 of Go¨del numbers
of Lωα+1-formulas within M:
ϕωβ(x) ⊜ ∃y(∃γ < ωβ)(x = 〈γ, y〉 ∧ Tδ+β(ϕγ+1(x))),
ϕωβ+k+1(x) ⊜ ϕωβ+k(x) ∨ ∃y (x = 〈ωβ + k, y〉 ∧A(y,Dϕωβ+k)).
The set H that we want to construct is encoded by the formula ϕω1+α(x).
Since the latter is given by a possibly non-standard Go¨del number in M,
in order to use it we put it inside an apropriate truth definition. Let γ =
δ + ωα + 1 and let ψ(x) be the formula Tγ(ϕω1+α(x)). Now we just need to
show that the set Dψ satisfies the required conditions on H, i.e., that
M  ∀β < ω1+α ∀x (x ∈ (Dψ)β ↔ A(x, (Dψ)<β)). (14)
Since M is a model of R<ω1+α+1(IB) and ωγ+ω < ω
1+α+1, the model M
satisfies R<ωγ+ω(R<ωγ+ω(IB)). Hence, in order to prove (14) it is enough to
show that within M, for all (possibly non-standard) β < ωα and all k, there
is an R<γ+ω(IB) proof of the equivalence
∀x (x ∈ (Dψ)ωβ+k ↔ A(x, (Dψ)<ωβ+k)). (15)
Further, we work within M. First, notice that R<γ+ω(IB) proves
∀x ∈ Lδ+β(Tδ+β(x)↔ Tδ+ωα(x)).
Let us construct an R<γ+ω(IB) proof of the equivalence
∀x (x ∈ (Dψ)<ωβ ↔ ϕωβ(x)).
We achieve this by subsequently proving in R<γ+ω(IB) the equivalence be-
tween the following formulas:
1. x ∈ (Dψ)<ωβ,
2. ψ(x) ∧ ∃z ∃δ < ωβ x = 〈δ, z〉,
3. ∃y ∃γ < ω1+α (x = 〈γ, y〉 ∧ Tδ+ωα(ϕγ+1(x))) ∧ ∃z ∃δ < ωβ x = 〈δ, z〉,
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4. ∃y ∃γ < ωβ (x = 〈γ, y〉 ∧ Tδ+ωα(ϕγ+1(x))),
5. ∃y ∃γ < ωβ (x = 〈γ, y〉 ∧ Tδ+β(ϕγ+1(x))),
6. ϕωβ(x).
Next, by induction on l we produce R<γ+ω(IB) proofs of
∀x (x ∈ (Dψ)<ωβ+l ↔ ϕωβ+l(x))
and of
∀x (x ∈ (Dψ)ωβ+l ↔ A(x,Dϕωβ+l)).
Therefore, R<γ+ω(IB) proves (15):
x ∈ (Dψ)ωβ+k ↔ A(x,Dϕωβ+k)
↔ A(x, (Dψ)<ωβ+k),
which concludes the proof of the lemma.✷
Proof of Lemma 9.6.We define an ω-interpretation Dωα+1 of (Π
0
1-CA)ω1+α
in R<ω1+α+1+ω(IB). In the interpretation Dωα+1 , sets are interpreted by
Go¨del numbers of Lωα+1-formulas ϕ(x) without other free variables. The
interpretation x ∈∗ ϕ of the membership predicate is defined by the formula
Tωα+1(ϕ(x)). In other words, the Go¨del number of ϕ(x) represents the set
Dϕ = {x | Tωα+1(ϕ(x))}.
Dωα+1 is a version of the modelDEFωα+1(N) formally constructed within
R<ω1+α+1+ω(IB). Since in R<ω1+α+1+ω(IB) we can prove the induction for all
Lωα+1 formulas, as well as a number of natural properties of Tωα+1 , we
can formalize the proof of Lemma 9.5 taking Dωα+1 as M. Thus, we see
that Dωα+1 is an ω-interpretation of (Π
0
1-CA0)ω1+α . Since the interpretation
of any second order formula is a formula of Lωα+1+1, the full scheme of
induction holds under this interpretation. ✷
9.3 Interpreting iterated reflection principles in iterated com-
prehension theories
In this section we finish the proofs of Theorem 9 and Theorem 10. The
key technical observation we need is Lemma 9.7 that will allow us to reason
about the translations EX within the theories of iterated Π
0
1-comprehension.
Recall that there is an axiomatization of each (Π01-CA0)α over ACA0 by a
single sentence asserting that for each X there exists the α-th Turing jump
X(α). In this assertion we could replace α with a variable x to obtain a
formula (Π01-CA0)x. This allows us to formulate Lemma 9.7.
Lemma 9.7 ACA0 proves that
∀X∀α < Λ ((Π01-CA0)ω(α+1) → ∃!P TP
X
α (P )).
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Before proving Lemma 9.7 we need to ‘bootstrap’ theory (Π01-CA0)α. Of-
ten, in the past works on the theories of iterated comprehension, in addition
to the comprehension principles the well-orderness of α was included as one
of the axioms. However, recently D. Flumini and K. Sato [23] observed
that the axiom of iterated Π01-comprehension along an order α implies the
well-foundedness of α. We will use a version of their result.
Lemma 9.8 In ACA0 it is provable that
∀α < Λ((Π01-CA)α →WO(α)).
Proof. Reasoning in ACA0, we consider some α < Λ and under the assump-
tion (Π01-CA)α claim that α is a well-ordering. Let us consider any set X of
ordinals < α and show that X is either empty or has the least element.
We claim that there exists Y ⊆ X such that for β ∈ X
β ∈ Y ⇐⇒ {γ ∈ Y | γ < β} = ∅. (16)
Indeed, we use (Π01-CA)α to construct Z such that, for β < α,
(Z)β = {x | x = 0 ∧ (∀γ < β)(γ ∈ X → 〈γ, 0〉 6∈ (Z)<β)}
and put
Y = {β < α | β ∈ X and 〈β, 0〉 ∈ Z}.
Notice that by (16) any element of Y is its least element, hence Y consists
of at most one element. If Y is empty then by (16)
∅ = Y = {β ∈ X | {γ ∈ Y | γ < β} = ∅} = X
and we are done. If Y = {β} then β is the least element of X, since (16)
guarantees that Y contains any element of X that is smaller than β.✷
Remark 9.9 The construction of Y in the proof of Lemma 9.8 essentially is
a variant of Yablo-Visser paradox [48, 46]. An interesting feature of the proof
is that it did not require the use of any kind of fixed points. This contrasts
with Visser’s construction [46], where he used the Diagonal Lemma to show
that the paradox is applicable to descending sequences of truth predicates.
Proof of Lemma 9.7. We reason in ACA0. Our goal is to prove
∀X∀α < Λ ((Π01-CA0)ω(α+1) → ∃!P TP
X
α (P )).
We consider some α < Λ and a set X. We assume (Π01-CA)ω(α+1) and claim
that there exists a unique P such that TPXα (P ).
Within this proof it will be useful to consider classes of sentences Cβ,n ⊆
Lβ consisting of all Lβ-sentences of logic depth n . Observe that Lα =⋃
β≤α,n∈ω
Cβ,n.
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Let us first prove that, for any two P,P ′, if TPXα (P ) and TP
X
α (P
′) then
P = P ′. For this it is enough to show that ∀β < α∀n (P ∩Cβ,n = P
′∩Cβ,n).
We prove the latter by a straightforward transfinite induction on the values
of ωβ + n. To justify the steps of induction we use the compositionality of
both P and P ′. We could use this kind of argument, since by Lemma 9.8
we have WO(ω(α+ 1)).
Now let us construct some P that is a compositional truth definition for
Lα over X. Using iterated comprehension we define a set E such that for
all β ≤ α and n ∈ ω:
1. (E)ωβ+n ⊆ Cβ,n;
2. (E)ωβ is the set of atomic Lβ-sentences that are true under the stan-
dard interpretation of arithmetical signature, interpretation of the
predicate X(x) as the set X, and the interpretation of predicates Tγ ,
for γ < β, as the sets
⋃
n∈ω
(E)ωγ+n;
3. each (E)ωβ+(n+1) consists of
(a) all elements of (E)ωβ+n;
(b) all sentences ϕ ∧ ψ such that ϕ,ψ ∈ (E)ωβ+n,
(c) all sentences ¬ϕ such that ϕ ∈ Cβ,n but ϕ 6∈ (E)ωβ+n,
(d) all sentences ∀x ϕ(x) such that ϕ(k) ∈ (E)ωβ+n, for all k.
We put P =
⋃
β≤α,n∈ω
(E)ωβ+n. With the use of arithmetical transfinite in-
duction over ω(α+1) it is easy to show that P has the desired properties.✷
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 9. For this we will first prove
Lemma 9.10 that provides us an embedding of the relevant truth theories
into the relevant iterated comprehension theories. Next, we prove Lemma
9.11 showing that the construction we used in Lemma 9.5 for proving L0
conservation actually yields the conservation for higher Lβ’s. Combining
Lemma 9.10 and Lemma 9.11 we immediately obtain Theorem 9.
Lemma 9.10 For all α > 0,
(Π01-CA0)ω1+α ⊇ω1+α+1 R<ω1+α+1(IB).
Proof. By Lemma 5.2 it is sufficient to check that for any fixed β < ωα+1
the theory (Π01-CA0)ωα proves that the EX -translations of the scheme UTBβ
and of the axiom Tβ-RFN(EA + UTB<β) hold for all X.
Recall that for any fixed β < ω1+α+1 the theory (Π01-CA0)ω1+α implies
(Π01-CA0)β . Thus, by Lemma 9.7, for any fixed β < ω
α+1, (Π01-CA0)ωα
proves that for any X and any β′ ≤ β there exist a unique compositional
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partial truth definition for Lβ′-sentences over X. We fix a β < ω
α+1 and an
instance
∀~x (ϕ(~x)↔ Tβ(ϕ(~x))) (17)
of the scheme UTBβ.
Further we reason in (Π01-CA0)ω1+α . For an arbitrary X we claim that
the EX -translations of (17) and the axiom Tβ-RFN(EA+ UTB<β) hold.
There is a unique set Pβ which is a compositional partial truth definition
for Lβ-sentences over X. Since Pβ is unique, we have
∀x (x ∈ Pβ ↔ EX(Tβ(x))).
Moreover, for each β′ occurring in ϕ (such a Tβ′ is necessarily less than β),
we have
∀x (x ∈ Pβ ∩ Lβ′ ↔ EX(Tβ′(x))).
Hence, by the compositionality of Pβ we easily verify (17).
Due to the compositionality of Pβ it is easy to check that any logical or
non-logical axiom of the Lβ-theory EA+UTB<β is an element of Pβ. Thus,
given a proof p of an Lβ sentence in EA + UTB<β, by a straightforward
induction on formulas in p we verify that the conclusion of p is an element
of Pβ. Since Pβ coincides with the EX-interpretation of Tβ, we infer that
the EX -translation of Tβ-RFN(EA + UTB<β) holds.✷
Lemma 9.11 For all α > 0,
(Π01-CA0)ω1+α ⊆ω1+α+1 R<ω1+α+1(IB).
Proof. In Lemma 9.5 we proved that for any model M of R<ω1+α+1(IB),
the model DEFωα+1(M) satisfies (Π
0
1-CA0)ω1+α . Recall that DX is the set
{a ∈ M | M  X(a)}. To prove the present lemma we need to verify
that for each β < ωα+1 the EDX -interpretation of Tβ within DEFωα+1(M)
coincides with Tβ within M. Indeed, this will imply that if M 6 ϕ, for some
Lωα+1-sentence ϕ, then DEFωα+1(M) 6 EDX (ϕ) and hence DEFωα+1(M) 6
∀Y EY (ϕ). Since the construction works for all M  R<ω1+α+1(IB), we will
infer the conclusion of the lemma.
Within DEFωα+1(M) the set DTβ clearly is a compositional truth pred-
icate for Lβ over DX . Since DEFωα+1(M) is a model of (Π
0
1-CA0)ω(β+1),
by Lemma 9.7 the set DTβ is the only compositional truth predicate for Lβ
over DX . Thus, Tβ within M coincide with the EDX -interpretation of Tβ
within DEFωα+1(M). ✷
This concludes the proof of Theorem 9. Now let us prove Theorem
10. We will use the same scheme as in the case of Theorem 9. First, we
prove Lemma 9.12 that provides an embedding of a theory of iterated truth
predicates into a theory of iterated comprehension. Second, in Lemma 9.13
we show that the construction of Lemma 9.6 yields conservation not only
for L0, but for Lωα+1 .
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Lemma 9.12 For all α > 0,
(Π01-CA)ω1+α ⊇ω1+α+1+ω R<ω1+α+1+ω(IB).
Proof. It is sufficient to verify in (Π01-CA)ω1+α that the following schemes
hold under the EX -translation, for any X:
1. UTBβ, for β ≤ ω
α+1;
2. Lωα+1+1-RFN(IB).
By a straightforward induction we prove ∀n ((Π01-CA0)ω1+αn) in the the-
ory (Π01-CA)ω1+α . Hence, by Lemma 9.7, the theory (Π
0
1-CA)ω1+α proves
that, for all β < ωα+1 and all sets X, there exists a unique set PXβ such that
TP
X
β (P
X
β ).
Using provable uniqueness of PXβ , for any particular instance of UTBβ
(for some β ≤ ωα+1) we easily prove its EX -translation in (Π
0
1-CA)ω1+α . Note
that there is a difference between the cases of β < ωα+1 and β = ωα+1. In
the latter case we do not have access to a set that is a compositional truth
definition for Lωα+1 . The EX -interpretation of Tωα+1 essentially is the union⋃
β<ωα+1 P
X
β (which is not necessarily a set).
Let us consider an instance of Lωα+1+1-RFN(IB)
∀~x (✷IBϕ(~x)→ ϕ(~x)), (18)
where ϕ is a Π
L
ωα+1+1
n -formula. Reasoning in (Π01-CA)ω1+α , we consider a
set X and claim that the EX -translation of (18) holds. We assume that for
some ~x we have ✷IBϕ(~x) and prove ϕ(~x).
By a formalized version of Lemma 5.2 we obtain ✷EA+UTB
≤ωα+1
ϕ(~x).
Recall that the theory EA + UTB≤ωα+1 is Π
L
ωα+1+1
2 -axiomatizable. Hence,
by a standard application of the cut-elimination theorem we get a EA +
UTB≤ωα+1-proof p of ϕ(~x), where all the formulas are from Π
L
ωα+1+1
n+2 .
In order to finish the proof we construct a compositional partial truth def-
inition Trn+2(y) for Π
L
ωα+1+1
n+2 -sentences such that Trn+2(ϕ(~x)) ↔ EX(ϕ(~x))
and the axioms from Π
L
ωα+1+1
2 -axiomatization of EA + UTB≤ωα+1 are true
in Trn+2. Given such a definition, by a straightforward induction on the
structure of p we show that the universal closures of all of them are true,
hence ϕ(~x) holds.
To define Trn+2, we evaluate atomic arithmetical sentences by their stan-
dard truth value, we evaluate X(x) by the set X, for β < ωα+1 we evaluate
predicates Tβ as P
X
β , and we evaluate Tωα+1 as
⋃
β<ωα+1
PXβ . Next, in a stan-
dard manner, we expand Trn+2 to all Π
L
ωα+1+1
n+2 -formulas (in Appendix A
we construct a partial truth definition for finite languages L, essentially the
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same construction works in the case that we are interested in here). Finally,
using the compositionality of PXβ , we verify that all the required axioms are
true in Trn+2.✷
Lemma 9.13 For all α > 0,
(Π01-CA)ω1+α ⊆ω1+α+1+ω R<ω1+α+1+ω(IB).
Proof. Let us work in R<ω1+α+1+ω(IB). In Lemma 9.6 we constructed an
ω-interpretation Dωα+1 of (Π
0
1-CA)ω1+α+1 in R<ω1+α+1+ω(IB). Let DX be the
set {x | Tωα+1(X(x))} within Dωα+1 . To prove the claim we just verify, for
any externally given β ≤ ωα+1, that
∀x (Tβ(x)↔ Dωα+1(EDX (Tβ(x)))). (19)
Or in other words, we show that the predicate Tβ coincide with Dωα+1-
interpretation of the EDX -interpretation of Tβ.
Observe that for β < ωα+1 the set DTβ = {x | Tωα+1(Tβ(x))} in Dωα+1 is
a compositional truth definition for Lβ over DX . Hence using the fact that
within Dωα+1 , for any γ < ω
α+1, there exists a unique compositional truth
definition for Lβ over DX , we easily obtain the equivalence (19) in the case
β < ωα+1.
To show (19) for the case β = ωα+1, we prove that, for all γ < ωα+1,
∀x ∈ Lγ (Tωα+1(x)↔ Dωα+1(EDX (Tωα+1(x)))). (20)
Within the Dωα+1-interpretation, the set DTγ is the only compositional par-
tial truth definition for Lγ over X. Hence,
Dωα+1(∀x ∈ Lγ (x ∈ DTγ ↔ EDX (Tωα+1(x)))),
and therefore
∀x ∈ Lγ (Tωα+1(Tγ(x))↔ Dωα+1(EDX (Tωα+1(x)))). (21)
Using Lγ+1-reflection we easily prove that for any ϕ ∈ Lγ , we have Tωα+1(ϕ)↔
Tωα+1(Tγ(ϕ)). Thus, we derive (20) from (21).✷
This concludes the proof of Theorem 10.
A Truth definitions for ΠLm-formulas
We consider a signature L extending that of arithmetic by finitely many
predicate letters. We assume that our language is that of Tait calculus,
that is, formulas are obtained from atomic ones and their negations by ∧,
∨, ∀ , ∃ . Our goal is to show the existence of suitable truth definitions for
∆L0 -formulas.
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Theorem 12 There is a ΠL1 -formula Tr such that for all ∆
L
0 -formulas ϕ(~x)
(i) EA ⊢ ∀~x (Tr(ϕ(~x))→ ϕ(~x));
(ii) EAL ⊢ ∀~x (Tr(ϕ(~x))↔ ϕ(~x)).
Let us define predicate Tr that is required in Theorem 12. In order to
construct Tr we first introduce a notion of a partial evaluation function s
for ∆L0 -sentences. Informally, s is called a partial evaluation function if s
is a locally correct assignment of truth values to some ∆0-sentences and
numerical values to some closed arithmetical terms. Within EA we define
predicate EF(s) as the conjunction of the following:
1. s is a finite function, whose domain consists of ∆L0 sentences and closed
arithmetical terms;
2. for ∆0-sentences ψ ∈ dom(s), the values s(ψ) ∈ {0, 1};
3. for terms t ∈ dom(s), the values s(t) are some natural numbers;
4. 0 ∈ dom(s)→ s(0) = 0;
5. for any closed term t, if (S(t)) ∈ dom(s), then t ∈ dom(s) and
s(S(t)) = S(s(t));
6. for any closed terms t, v, if (t + v) ∈ dom(s), then t, v ∈ dom(s) and
s(t+ v) = s(t) + s(v);
7. for any closed terms t, v, if (t × v) ∈ dom(s), then t, v ∈ dom(s) and
s(t× v) = s(t)s(v);
8. for any closed term t, if (exp(t)) ∈ dom(s), then t ∈ dom(s) and
s(exp(t)) = exp(s(t));
9. for any ψ(x1, . . . , xn) that is an L-predicate or its negation and any
closed terms t1, . . . , tn, if ψ(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ dom(s), then t1, . . . , tn ∈
dom(s) and s(ψ(t1, . . . , tn)) = 1↔ ψ(s(t1), . . . , s(tn));
10. for any ∆L0 -sentences ϕ,ψ, if (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ dom(s), then ϕ,ψ ∈ dom(s)
and s(ϕ ∧ ψ) = 1↔ s(ϕ) = 1 ∧ s(ψ) = 1;
11. for any ∆L0 -sentences ϕ,ψ, if (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ dom(s), then ϕ,ψ ∈ dom(s)
and s(ϕ ∨ ψ) = 1↔ s(ϕ) = 1 ∨ s(ψ) = 1;
12. for any ∆L0 -formula ϕ(x) without other free variables, if (∀x 6 t ϕ) ∈
dom(s), then t ∈ dom(s), ∀m ≤ s(t) ϕ(m) ∈ dom(s), and s(∀x 6
t ϕ(x)) = 1↔ ∀m 6 s(t) s(ϕ(m)) = 1;
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13. for any ∆L0 -formula ϕ(x) without other free variables, if (∃x 6 t ϕ) ∈
dom(s), then t ∈ dom(s), ∀m ≤ s(t) ϕ(m) ∈ dom(s), and s(∃x 6
t ϕ(x)) = 1↔ ∃m 6 s(t) s(ϕ(m)) = 1.
We note that, since L is finite, the quatifier over predicate symbols of L in
clause 9. could be formalized in L as a finite conjunction. We notice that
the external unbounded quantifiers over terms or formulas in clauses 1.–13.
can, in fact, be bounded by s, since the objects they represent are encoded
in the finite function s. Henceforth EF(x) could be EA-provably equivalently
transformed into a ∆L0 -formula.
Observe that provably in EA, different evaluation function agree with
each other on the intersections of their domains.
Lemma A.1 (EA) If EF(s1) and EF(s2), then
s1 ↾ (dom(s1) ∩ dom(s2)) = s2 ↾ (dom(s1) ∩ dom(s2)).
Proof. We reason in EA. Consider some partial evaluation functions s1, s2.
By induction on the length of terms t ∈ dom(s1) ∩ dom(s2) we prove that
s1(t) = s2(t). Next, by induction on the number of connective in sentences
ϕ ∈ dom(s1) ∩ dom(s2) we prove that s1(ϕ) = s2(ϕ). Notice that despite
the proofs of steps of induction rely on the use of additional predicates from
L, the induction formulas are ∆0. Thus the proofs are formalizable in EA.✷
Now, in terms of EF(x), we define
Tr(ϕ) := ∀s (EF(s) ∧ ϕ ∈ dom(s)→ s(ϕ) = 1).
Lemma A.2 For each arithmetical term t(x1, . . . , xn)
EA ⊢ ∀s∀m1, . . . ,mn (EF(s)∧(t(m1, . . . ,mn)) ∈ dom(s)→
t(m1, . . . ,mn) = s(t(m1, . . . ,mn))).
Proof. By induction on the construction of t, using clauses 5.–8. of the
definition of ES.✷
Lemma A.3 For each ∆L0 formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)
EA ⊢ ∀s∀m1, . . . ,mn (EF(s) ∧ (ϕ(m1, . . . mn)) ∈ dom(s)→
(ϕ(m1, . . . ,mn)↔ s(ϕ(m1, . . . mn)) = 1)).
Proof.We prove the lemma by induction on construction of ϕ, using clauses
9.–13. of the definition of ES. When in the induction step we consider the
cases of formulas ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) starting with a bounded quantifier we use
Lemma A.2.✷
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Lemma A.4 For each ∆L0 formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) we have
EAL ⊢ ∀m1, . . . ,mn∃s (EF(s) ∧ ϕ(m1, . . . ,mn) ∈ s).
Proof. First we prove by induction on construction of terms t(x1, . . . , xn)
that there is a term bt(x1, . . . , xn) such that
EAL ⊢ ∀m1, . . . ,mn∃s ≤ bt(m1, . . . ,mn) (EF(s) ∧ t(m1, . . . ,mn) ∈ dom(s)).
(22)
And next, by induction on the construction of ∆L0 formulas ϕ(x1, . . . , xn),
we prove that there is a term bϕ(x1, . . . , xn) such that
EAL ⊢ ∀m1, . . . ,mn∃s ≤ bϕ(m1, . . . ,mn) (EF(s)∧ϕ(m1, . . . ,mn) ∈ dom(s)).
(23)
Essentially, the induction steps in the proofs of both (22) and (23) are
reduced to merging partial evaluation functions which are known to exist
by the induction assumption. The fact that we could perform this merging
could be justified using Lemma A.1. We note that in the proof of induction
step the only two cases for ϕ, when it is important that we consider the
theory EAL rather than EA, are the cases when the top-most connective
in ϕ is a bounded quantifier. The reason for this is that those are the only
cases when inside an EAL-argument we need to perform a merging of partial
evaluation functions s1, . . . , sk, where k, from external point of view, might
not be a standard number.
From (23) we immediately derive the lemma.✷
Proof of Theorem 12. Using Lemma A.3 and the definition of Tr we
derive part (i) of Theorem 12. Combining (i) with Lemma A.4 we prove
part (ii).✷
The classes ΠLn and Σ
L
n are defined from ∆
L
0 as usual: Π
L
0 = Σ
L
0 = ∆
L
0 ,
ΠLn+1 = {∀~x ϕ(~x) : ϕ ∈ Σ
L
n}, and Σ
L
n+1 = {∃~x ϕ(~x) : ϕ ∈ Π
L
n}. The
corresponding truth predicates can be inductively defined as follows:
• Tr(x) serves as a truth definition for ΣL0 ;
• TrΠLn+1
(ϕ) := ∀ψ ∈ ΣLn (ϕ ⊜ ∀~x ψ(~x)→ ∀z TrΣLn (ψ((z)0, . . . , (z)k−1)));
• TrΣLn+1
(ϕ) := ¬TrΠLn+1
(¬ϕ).
In the last item, ¬ϕ is obtained by de Morgan rules from ϕ, therefore ϕ ∈ ΣLm
iff ¬ϕ ∈ ΠLm. Then we readily obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 13 Let Γ be either ΠLn or Σ
L
n , n > 1. For each ϕ(~x) ∈ Γ,
(i) EAL ⊢ ∀~x (ϕ(~x)↔ TrΓ(ϕ(~x)));
(ii) EA ⊢ ∀~x (ϕ(~x)→ TrΓ(ϕ(~x))) if Γ = Π
L
2k−1 or Σ
L
2k, for some k > 1;
(iii) EA ⊢ ∀~x (TrΓ(ϕ(~x))→ ϕ(~x)) if Γ = Σ
L
2k−1 or Π
L
2k, for some k > 1.
We are actually using Statement (i) and Statememnt (ii) for Γ = ΠL1 .
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